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THE INFLUENCE OF STATE-LEVEL RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY
INSTRUMENTS ON ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
A CROSS-SECTIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
SUNJOO PARK
ABSTRACT
Since the late 1990s, state governments in the U.S. have diversified policy instruments
for encouraging the electric power industry to deploy renewable sources for electricity
generation. While observing the increasing number of new renewable energy policies at
the state level governments, this study raised two research questions: (1) how do state
governments intervene in the renewable energy market? and (2) how do various policy
approaches taken by state governments affect renewable energy development? To answer
for these questions, this study attempts to identify the trends and variations in renewable
energy policy designs among states in terms of the combination of aggregate level policy
instruments used by state authorities. Additionally, this study aims to examine and
compare the effectiveness of policy instruments in the deployment of renewable energy
sources for electricity production.
This study examined 18 state legislative, renewable energy related regulations,
programs, or financial incentives existing between 2001 and 2010 in 48 states. Those 18
individual renewable energy policies were classified into three types of policy
instruments: command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments. For the
analysis, this study measured the amount and share of the electricity generation from nonhydro renewable sources as renewable energy policy effects. In order to isolate policy
effects, this study also considered state specific characteristics such as natural endowment,
iv

economic and political environments, and the market conditions of electric power
industries in different states.
This study employed fixed-effects models to analyze cross-sectional time series
data. The results showed that states’ adoption of diverse command-and-control types of
policy instruments have significantly influenced the increase of both the amount and
share of renewable electricity, while informative policy tools helped increase the share of
renewable sources used by electric power producers. However, diversification of marketbased policy instruments—especially financial incentives—did not significantly affect
the increase of renewable electricity generation in states. Besides governmental
intervention, state wealth and citizen interest in environmental issues played important
roles in inducing more investment in renewable energy technologies. Also, natural gas
price, wind speed, and states’ export of electricity determined the proportion of
renewable electricity in states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1990s, state governments in the United States have restructured
their electricity market systems to adopt numerous policies and programs that regulate the
sources of power generation and promote renewable energy development. State
governments began deregulating electricity market systems during the 1990s, believing
that privatization of utility provision and competition between electricity utilities would
enhance the efficiency of energy production and thus lower electricity rates. In reality,
however, signs of market failure began to appear in the United States’ electricity market.
Electricity rates rose across the states due to the monopolized (or oligopolized) electricity
markets. Increasing energy dependence and lack of sustainable energy resources drove up
the electricity rates. Electricity production’s heavy dependence on fossil fuel also
generated a significant amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, influencing global
climate change.
In the late 1990s, when the U.S. state governments re-regulated their electricity
market, they magnified and diversified regulations and programs for promoting
1

renewable energy. During and after the restructuring of electricity market systems, new
environmental policy instruments such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and
performance-based incentives (“feed-in tariff”) have been increasingly adopted at the
state level. For instance, the number of states that adopted mandatory renewable portfolio
standards increased from only five in 2000 to 29 states and D.C. today. Market-based
incentives such as tax differentiation and marketable permits (cap-and-trade) have been
proposed and implemented for purposes of cost efficiency and compliance. A state’s
social and political contexts affect the policies designed and utilized within the state
(Berry and Berry, 1990; Matisoff, 2008; Yi and Feiock, 2012), which, when used
appropriately, could positively influence the outcome of its policies. However, recent
renewable energy policies adopted by many states do not seem to explicitly reflect their
social and policy contexts; at least not in any readily recognizable way. Rather, the states’
latest renewable energy regulations and taxations seem to follow the national trend of
emphasizing energy independence and novel environmental policy instruments.
Throughout the United States, renewable energy policies at the state level have been
increasing in magnitude as well as diversifying in terms of the types of policy instruments,
generating considerable variation among states (Gan, Eskeland, and Kolshus, 2007).
As the number of new renewable energy policies at the state level has increased,
so have policy analyses and evaluations focusing on individual programs (Carley, 2009;
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and Shimshack, 2010;
Menz and Vachon, 2006; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011; Yin and Powers, 2010).
Effectiveness of states’ renewable energy policies has not yet been entirely evaluated and
understood (Carley, 2011). Moreover, no study has clearly examined how well various
2

renewable energy policy instruments work together (Carley, 2011). In order to trace and
understand policy changes over time, categorization of policy instruments has been
considered to be necessary as a step in developing an effective indicator (OECD, 2001;
Persson, 2006; Richards, 2000). Analyzing the aggregate level policy instruments could
provide an overview on the diversity of policy mixes, enabling the analysis of the
effectiveness of each policy instrument and thus the development of optimal
combinations of policy design (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Vedung, 1998).
This research is expected to provide a perspective on the extent of U.S. states’ (as
a whole and also as individuals) involvement in renewable energy deployment. By
comparing the magnitude of renewable energy policies/programs adopted and
implemented over the last decade, the research will also show the variation in and
changes of states’ interest in renewable energy development. Then, this study will
categorize the renewable energy policies into three types based on coerciveness and
behavioral assumptions: (1) command-and-control, (2) market-based, and (3) information
policy instruments. Categorization of renewable energy policy instruments will be
analyzed in relation to the states’ contexts of natural resource, economic and political
circumstances, and electric power market conditions, which are considered as
determinants of policy choices and implementation. This will provide explanations for
the variation in renewable energy policy choices among states; such variation will be
accounted for in the research design to control the determinants’ effect on renewable
energy development.
The primary purpose of this study is to identify the variation in renewable energy
policy designs among states in terms of the combination of policy instruments used by
3

state authorities. This study additionally aims to examine the marginal effects of
corresponding policy instruments. It will contribute to states’ policy designs by showing
the overall trends of U.S. renewable energy policy adoptions at the state level. It will
offer a comprehensive overview of the evolution of energy policies since the 1990s in all
of contiguous 48 states; which in turn will hopefully help states make better energy
policy decisions in light of their own contextual variables. In addition, this study will
contribute to the body of knowledge of public policy instrument mixes and their
effectiveness.

4

CHAPTER II
RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS

2.1 Background of Renewable Energy Evolution in the United States
In the history of renewable energy development in the world, the United States
led the early development of renewable energy industries through federal level legislation
beginning in the late 1970s. By the 1990s, however, European countries had
outperformed the US in developing renewable energy markets. During this period,
countries across Europe adopted and implemented a variety of policy instruments to
develop renewable energy production. Examples of these policy instruments include
national legislation such as Renewables Obligations (U.K.) or national quotas (Austria,
Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and Sweden) (Haas, et al. 201; Reiche and Bechberger, 2004)1,
as well as non-legislative instruments such as green pricing activities and self-obligations
(Enzensberger, Wietschel, and Rentz 2002). In the meantime, state governments in the
United States began electricity market restructuring and renewable energy development

1

Detailed overviews on the national policy instruments promoting renewable energy development in
Europe, IEA (1997) and Moore and Ihle (1999).
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through innovative policy designs. The U.S.’s renewable electricity industry has
expanded even more dramatically in the last few years with a Federal stimulus package
given to states for the purpose of recovery from economic recession of 2008.
The development of renewable energy policies in the United States features three
distinct phases. The first phase is the birth of modern renewable electricity industry in the
U.S. through Federal legislation from the late 1970s to the 1980s. Between the late 1980s
and to early 1990s is the phase of stagnation in the growth of renewable energy industry
in the U.S. Since the late 1990s, state governments opened the new era for renewable
energy industry through innovative policy designs. The Federal enactment of the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) started the first phase—the era of
modern renewable energy industry. PURPA of 1978 required that electric utilities
purchase power from qualifying third parties—meaning independent renewable energy
generators or cogenerators—at the utilities’ “avoided cost” (Martinot, Wiser, and Hamrin,
2005; Wiser, Pickle, and Goldman, 1998). This was the first use of a “feed-in” policy that
offered electric utilities to purchase renewable electricity at the projected wholesale cost
of conventional or fossil-fuel electricity, which approximately equals the “avoided costs”
to the utilities.
Since the 1990s, European countries chose feed-in tariffs as a popular strategy to
promote generation of electricity from renewables. Germany, Denmark, Italy, Austria,
France, and Netherlands have adopted feed-in tariffs as their main electricity support
schemes, combined with quota obligations or other tax incentives (Haas, et al., 2011).
Their feed-in prices are usually fixed by law for each renewable energy technologies

6

and/or set based on a certain percentage of the average electricity price (Martinot, Wiser,
and Hamrin, 2005).
In response to the PURPA of 1978, several states developed ‘standard offer’
contracts, long-term contracts at a fixed tariff open to renewable power plants. California
succeeded in development of its renewable energy industry through its aggressive
implementation of PURPA along with generous state and federal tax incentives in the
1980s (Wiser, Pickle, and Goldman, 1998).
However, various tax incentives given to renewable energy industry were
eliminated in the late 1980s and renewable energy markets remained stagnant in the
following decade. Several reasons contributed to the declined interest in renewable
energy: Fossil fuel prices, especially natural gas prices, dropped drastically and electric
power utilities no longer had incentives to enter into ‘standard offer’ contracts because
feed-in tariffs based on avoided cost declined (Martinot, Wiser, and Hamrin, 2005).
In addition, electric power markets began restructuring at both the federal and
state levels in the early 1990s. The electric power sectors were forced to reorganize their
systems into competitive regimes, including competitive wholesale markets and retail
power competition along with unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution.
Developers in electric power industries deferred their decision of investment until the
completion of electricity market restructuring and the preparation of final rules (Martinot,
Wiser, and Hamrin, 2005).
In the late 1990s, however, a new era for renewable energy began in the United
States. While electric power markets lost their taste for the federal level incentives under
7

the PURPA of 1978, a number of new renewable energy policies were adopted at the
state level in the process of the electricity market restructuring. Examples of state level
policies driving renewable energy development included state tax and financial incentives,
wholesale market rules, renewable portfolio standards (RPS), voluntary purchases of
green power, and information disclosure. State governments’ designs for renewable
energy policy vary considerably in magnitude and diversity of policy instruments adopted.
Energy industries also have continued to deploy renewable energy technologies
and reduce carbon emission voluntarily with the encouragement of federal financial
incentives such as production (PTC) and investment tax credits (ITC) or grants in lieu
(Section 1603) for renewable energy. In addition to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA), the Federal Production Tax Credit and Renewable Energy
Production Incentive created under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 also contributed to the
development of renewable energy industry (Bird, et al., 2005; Menz and Vachon, 2006).
Facing the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Congress enacted the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of
2009. §1603 program under ARRA, administered by the Department of Treasury in
conjunction with the Department of Energy, offers cash grants in lieu of tax credits to
renewable energy project developers. Section 1603 program aims to help expansion of
investment in large solar and wind energy projects (Steinberg, Porro, and Goldberg,
2012).

8

2.1.1 Definition of Renewable Energy Policy
For the purpose of this study, “renewable energy” is restricted to the electricity
production sector (also exchangeable with supply or generation) side and pertains only to
the on-grid electricity generated from renewable resources, which excludes nonelectricity energy use such as transportation or other methods to secure energy supply
such as energy efficiency.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)’s Energy
Glossary, renewable energy resources (or renewables) are “energy resources that are
naturally replenishing but flow-limited; inexhaustible in duration but limited in the
amount of energy available per unit of time.” Renewable energy resources for electricity
generation, in general, include hydro, solar, wind, biomass2, geothermal3, ocean thermal,
wave action, and tidal action.4 Conventional sources of electricity generation –
petroleum, natural gas, coal are excluded from renewables in this study. This study also
excludes the “advanced energy technologies”5 from the scope of renewable energy
sources.
Policy instruments aimed at promoting renewable energy generation consist of
legislative instruments implemented by governmental authorities and non-legislative
instruments supported by market players (Enzensberger, et al., 2002). Renewable energy
2

Biomass is non-fossil material of biological origin such as wood and combustible renewable and waste
(International Energy Agency). Solid biomass, liquid biomass, biogas, industrial and municipal wastes
consist of renewable energy resource of biomass (EIA).
3
Electricity can be generated from heat (hot water or steam) under the Earth’s surface.
4
EIA’s Energy Glossary, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm.
5
Ohio’s Energy Bill (Senate Bill 221), passed in 2008, includes the “Alternative Energy Portfolio
Standard,” which considers “renewable energy” and “advanced energy” as alternative energy technologies
to meet the mandated goal for electricity generators and suppliers. “Advanced energy” includes clean coal,
advanced nuclear, fuel cells, energy efficiency, etc. The renewable energy in this study excludes the
sources and technologies defined as “advanced energy.”
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policies that are discussed in this study stand for the legislative instruments including
government mechanisms, efforts, and measures to promote the process of electricity
production from renewable energy resources.
2.1.2 Goals of Renewable Energy Policy
This section reviews the policy goals that current renewable energy policies are
intended to accomplish. The common goal of renewable energy policies can be simply
stated to use more renewable energy technologies. There are, however, various goals that
governments expect renewable energy to achieve (Komor and Bazilian, 2005). Komor
and Bazilian (2005) define three broad goals of renewable energy policies: energy goals
(energy supply security, energy price volatility reduction, and low energy price),
environmental goals (pollution reduction and environmental sustainability promotion),
and economic and industrial development goals (local/regional economic development,
domestic employment increase). Beck and Martinot (2004) classify currently
implemented renewable energy policies pertaining to their primary policy goals:
renewable energy promotion, transport biofuels, emission reduction, power sector
restructuring, distributed generation, and rural electrification policies.
This study is to select a policy goal and analyze and compare the effectiveness of
different types of policy instruments aiming at the same goal. Governments develop
different policy designs and combinations of various policy instruments to meet different
policy goals. Expected policy outcomes vary depending on policy goals because they
strongly influence the effectiveness of policy implementation. Depending on its stated
goals, different indicators are needed to measure the achievement of given policy goals.

10

Governments often adopt renewable energy policies with various implicit and explicit
objectives. Depending on the definition of the goal of renewable energy policy, the
output measures of renewable energy development vary among net renewable electricity
generation, renewable electricity purchase, renewable electricity consumption, etc.
This study limits its scope of analysis to the renewable energy policies aiming at
promotion of the production of electricity from renewable resources. The entire range of
legislative regulations, programs and incentives that the U.S. state governments have
adopted and implemented to directly and indirectly support electricity generation from
renewable resources are found in the analysis section of this study. This study analyzes
in-state renewable electricity generation from all types of power producers. There are
various electric producers consisting of utility and nonutility power producers that
generate and transmit (purchase and distribute) electricity. Not all electric producers,
however, generate renewable electricity to meet the mandated goal set by legislative
authority, such as renewable portfolio standards. Instead, they may purchase renewable
electricity generated from other states through transmission. An electric utility is a
corporation, agency, authority, person, or other legal entity delivering electric energy
primarily for commercial, industrial, and residential use. Electric utilities include
publicly-owned utilities such as municipal and state utilities, Federal electric utilities,
investor-owned utilities which are privately owned entities, and cooperative electric
utilities. In the United States, there are more than 3,233 electric utilities, ensuring a
reliable source of electricity to all consumers as of 2010 (EIA, 2012b, p.311). As of 2007,
210 investor-owned electric utilities represented about 38% of utility installed capacity,
42 % of electricity generation and served about 71% of ultimate consumers (EIA, 2007).
11

Nonutility power generation refers to electric generation by end-users, or small power
producers. Nonutility power producers include independent power producers, qualifying
co-generators, and small power producers. About 1,738 nonutility power producers exist
across the nation. Independent power producers (IPP) operate within the territories of
host utilities and must use renewable as a primary source of electricity generation. They
do not sell electricity on the retail market; instead they sell electricity on the wholesale
market at non-regulated prices (EIA, 2007). They do not file forms listed in the Code of
Federal Regulations, Title 18, Part 141.
2.2 Public Policy Instruments
2.2.1 Definition of Public Policy Instruments
This section addresses the importance of policy instruments in practical public
policy design, implementations, and studies. Public policy instruments are defined as “a
set of techniques by which governmental authorities—or proxies acting on behalf of
governmental authorities—wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect
social change” (Vedung, 1998). With the same policy goal, the result could be different
depending on the policy instruments that the governments choose to implement, which
determines the mechanisms for enforcement. “The use of various policy instruments for
governance purposes will probably have different consequences on the nature of
addressee responses” (Vedung, 1998).
Policy instrument choice affects the level of responsible government and types of
institution. Policies enacted at the Federal government (or national government) level
generally require a great degree of complexity and consensus. Policies that influence and
12

utilize natural resources tend to be assigned to the state and regional levels (Bernstein,
1993). A World Bank report (Bernstein, 1993) suggested several lessons about alternative
approaches to designing environmental policy, after the successful models of developed
countries. Market-based instruments (or economic incentives) cannot replace commandand-control (or regulatory) instruments nor be effectively implemented without preexisting standards.
Bernstein (1993) calls for further studies to 1) evaluate the effectiveness of
various regulatory and economic instruments; 2) analyze the circumstances under which
(economic) policy instruments can be successfully implemented; and 3) suggest the
appropriate combination of policy instruments for developing countries. Also, Bernstein
(1993) points out the importance of compatibility of new environmental policy
instruments mixes with given political, economic, administrative, and judicial conditions
as well as consistency with overall environmental policy.
Bennear and Stavins (2007) justified optimal implementation of multiple policy
instruments in pursuit of a policy goal. They argued that for different types of problems
under different environments, different instruments are appropriate. The use of “hybrid”
instruments that combine a quantity and a price instrument has been explored recently.
The authors asserted that multiple policy instruments could be optimal under the
circumstances where multiple constraints exist such as political constraints, market
failures, or policy failures. They framed that multiple constraints prevent attainment of
multiple Pareto optimality, so that adjustment of one constraint (use of one type of policy
instrument) does not enhance welfare (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). Therefore, market

13

failures generated from multiple constraints can be “jointly ameliorating,” “jointly
reinforcing,” or “neutral” through second-best policy making.
In the contemporary public policy environment of governance, policy instruments
have undergone development and diversification. However, diversification and
magnification of policy instruments without supportive evidence of their effectiveness
through carefully designed and conducted evaluation of given policy instrument mixes or
combinations do not guarantee governments better to achieve policy goals. Another topic
to explore concerns the conditions and context under which a particular combination of
policy instruments would be utilized and appropriate (Bennear and Stavins, 2007;
Howlett, 2004).
Vedung (1998) argues that empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of governing
instruments constitute a valid test of classification schemes for policy instruments. Also,
the theoretical issues addressed in policy instruments theories help raise important
research questions for future empirical evaluation. For example, what policy instruments
are mixed and combined in horizontal6 and vertical dimensions? What are the variables
affecting the choice of policy instruments in organizational, political, and social (cultural)
contexts? How does a chosen policy instrument affect public’s receptiveness of the
programs, the politics of policy implementations, and the effectiveness and efficiency of
government programs or policies (Vedung, 1998)? This study applies empirical analysis
in a quest to answer these crucial research questions.

6

Vedung (1998) refers the “horizontal packaging of policy instruments as the use of combined instruments
for the same purpose.
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2.2.2 Categorization of Public Policy Instruments – Typology of Policy Instruments
Although interest in policy instrumentation and policy mixes has increased, there
exists limited policy analysis and public administration literature about a general and
universal classification of policy instruments. The basis of the classification of policy
instruments, however, can be found in literature, which discusses the general features of
policy instruments and their relevance to the classification of renewable energy policy
instruments.
The definitions of the types of policy instruments vary based on differing
assumptions. This section reviews a previous literature that discusses classificatory
schemes of policy instruments and the basis of policy instrument classification.
Categories depend upon the defining features of each study, from a dichotomous
approach such as regulation and incentives to six types. The traditional distinction divides
policy instruments into either regulatory versus market-based or economic instruments
(Bernstein, 1993; Callan and Thomas, 2004; Harrington, Morgenstern, and Sterner, 2004;
Stavins, 1991). Discussions about market-based approach or economic instruments began
since the 1980s through 1990s as an alternative approach to command-and-control type
of environmental policy initiatives. Economists incorporated the market-based approach
into the environmental policy such as pollution control, sewage and waste management,
and energy conservation. Using economic incentives, market-based instruments are
designed to allow polluters more flexibility to respond according to their own selfinterests (Callan and Thomas, 2004; Harrington et al., 2004).

15

Schneider and Ingram (1990) classify policy tools into five groups based on the
behavioral characteristics of each policy tool. They emphasize the importance of the
motivational devices embedded in policy tools that empower people. Policies implicitly
guide people to take actions that conform to policy goals. With well-designed policy tools,
people might comply with policy rules, utilize the policy opportunities, or take selfinitiated action. Schneider and Ingram (1990) point out five reasons that people do not
take actions: (1) lack of authority of law to direct them, (2) lack of incentives, (3) lack of
capacity, (4) disagreement with the implicit value of policy goals, and (5) high level of
uncertainty. They define five policy tools addressing those five reasons—authority,
incentive, capacity, symbolic and hortatory, and learning tools—and argue that the policy
tools reflect the political culture. Vedung (1998) and OECD (1994) define policy
instruments with a trifold classificatory scheme: regulation (the stick), economic means
(the carrot), and information (the sermon) based on the degree of authoritative force
involved. Vedung (1998) embodies Etzioni (1975)’s work7 as a basis of the trifold
scheme of policy instruments. There is an assumption that policy instrument choice is
related to a society’s dominant political and administrative ideologies and strategies.
Vedung (1998) attempts to characterize policy instruments with three defining properties:
(1) coercion, (2) the use of material resources, and (3) intellectual or moral appeals.
The degree of the coerciveness characterizes policy instruments (Linder and Peter,
1987; Salamon, 2002; Vedung, 1998). The degree of coerciveness measures the extent to
which a tool set by governments can intervene in and restrict individual or group

7

Etzioni (1975) claims three kinds of power which are means to control subject to comply and to achieve
organizational purposes. He defines coercive, renumerative, and normative power as means for control
purposes.
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behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it (Doern and Phidd, 1983;
Salamon, 2002). There is at least some degree of coerciveness involved in most forms of
governmental intervention. Based on the extent to which policies rely on this, however,
individual policies can be grouped together (Salamon, 2002). Salamon (2002) classifies
illustrative policy tools into three groups by degree of coerciveness—high, medium, and
low— and hypothesizes likely impacts of policy tools according to the degree of coercion.
Social and economic regulations are considered highly coercive instruments imposing
formal limitations on undesirable activities. Market-based approaches of policy
instruments that involve a medium degree of coerciveness include grants, loans, subsidies,
and corrective taxes. Tax expenditures are considered less coercive. Information and
voluntary instruments have the least coerciveness (Doern and Phidd, 1983; Salamon,
2002). In addition, Doern and Phidd (1983) further discuss that government corporations
and government purchase of assets represent policy tools involving the maximum degree
of coerciveness. Salamon (2002) expects that all other things being equal, more coercive
tools are more effective, based on previous policy implementation literature,
Some studies categorize policy instruments based on their functional features
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; OECD, 2001). Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007)
categorize the types of policy instruments into five groups: (1) legislative and regulatory,
(2) economic and fiscal, (3) agreement based and incentive based, (4) communication
based and information based, (5) de jure and de facto standards instruments. OECD
(2001) claims that appropriate “policy packages” need to be well designed to deal with
market failure and achieve environmental goals. OECD (2001; 2003a) classifies the
environmental policy instruments into six types: (1) regulatory instruments, (2)
17

economic instruments, (3) liability and damage compensation8, (4) education and
information, (5) voluntary, and (6) management and planning.
Three categories of policy instruments—command-and-control, market-based,
and information instruments—are not only found in the trifold scheme of policy
instruments (Vedung, 1998; OECD, 2001), but also commonly used in other literature
categorizing policy instruments with a typology containing five or six categories
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007, Mickwitz, 2003; Salamon, 2002; Schneider and Ingram,
1990). These studies add several categories to the existing command-and-control,
economic means, and information instruments. Additional categories other than trifold
schemes such as education or planning, however, are not exclusive and distinct in their
behavioral assumption and authoritative coerciveness. An empirical study that classifies
and evaluates policy instruments on a certain issue needs a classificatory theme which is
exclusive among categories and applicable to a variety of issues. In that, three categories
of command-and-control, economic incentives, and information instruments represent
effective renewable energy policies classification. This study employs Vedung (1998)’s
definition of three types of policy instruments and applies the defining property of each
instrument based on the coerciveness (Vedung, 1998) and behavioral assumptions
(Schneider and Ingram, 1990) to the classification of renewable energy policies. Figure 1
illustrates the three types of policy instruments that this study refers to for the analysis.

8

In OECD (2001) report, one of six policy instruments is “incentives for technological development and
diffusion.” OECD (2003a) refers its report in 2001, but it changes incentives for technology to liability and
damage compensation.
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Figure 1. Basic Trifold Typology of Policy Instruments

Policy Instruments

Command-and-Control

Market-Based

Information

Command-and-Control Policy Instruments
Policy instruments implemented by governmental units to influence targets
through authoritative means are defined as command-and-control (regulatory)
instruments. Under the command-and-control policy, target persons or agents respond to
what they are told by the controllers. This policy instrument modifies the set of options of
agents face in their choice sets of alternative actions by formulating rules and directives,
and setting supervisory systems (OECD, 1994; Schneider & Ingram, 1990; Vedung,
1998). The defining property of command-and-control (or regulation) instruments is the
authoritative nature in the relationship between controller/government agency and target
population (Vedung, 1998).9 Subtypes of command-and-control policy instruments
include performance and process standards, licenses/permits, bans, and zoning
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Vedung, 1998).
Although command-and-control instruments have been criticized for their
inefficiency due to relatively higher administrative costs and less flexibility given to

9

The term regulation defined in this paper is different with some definitions frequently used in the U.S.,
which include all types of government intervention and political control (Meier, 1985; Vedung, 1998).
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market players, the components of these instruments such as rules, standards, and
regulations are still believed to provide higher certainty of policy outcomes compared to
economic principles or suasion (Harrington, et al., 2004; Weimer and Vinning, 1999). A
wide applicability of regulatory instruments partially accounts for the effectiveness of
regulatory instruments (Campbell, Johnson, and Larson, 2004).
Market-Based Instruments
In an effort to convince people to find the government-desired behavior more
economically attractive than the undesired one, governments try to alter the market
conditions or economic frameworks through economic instruments (Enzensberger, et al.,
2002). Underneath the market-based approach or economic instruments lies an
assumption that individuals are utility maximizers who take opportunities to make
choices in their own best interests. Incentive instruments rely on tangible pay-offs to
motivate target people to comply with or utilize policies. Tangible pay-offs here refer to
money, life, and liberty, to name a few. State governments usually offer (positive)
monetary benefit as incentives for renewable energy development (Schneider and Ingram,
1990). Economic policy instruments alter the costs or benefits for the target persons or
agents, but the target agents are not obligated to comply with and use the measures
involved. The most suitable use of economic and market-based policy instruments
involves cases where the policy fosters long-term development in a given market place
rather than risking a disaster management (Enzensberger, et al, 2002). Economic
instruments include charges, subsidies, grants, and loans operated with a medium degree
of coercion on public units; also, tax expenditures such as tax credits, deductions, and
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exemptions are considered relatively less coercive economic incentives (Vedung, 1998;
OECD, 1994; Salamon, 2002).
Ever since the demonstration of benefits and cost effectiveness of market-based
policy instruments, a growing consensus has been made over the advantage of applying
market-based instruments to environmental areas such as greenhouse gas emissions,
renewable energy development, waste management, and natural resources (Hammar,
2006). Even though cost effectiveness in the implementation process marks the marketbased instruments’ strength, it does not guarantee a better achievement of policy goals. In
other words, when it comes to policy outcomes or policy effectiveness, market-based
policy instruments might not deliver as much as policy makers expect them to (Hammar,
2006).
Information Instrument
The third category of policy instruments is information instruments10 which
influence target people through knowledge transfer, communication, and persuasion.
Information instruments assume that lack of information and skills prevents potential
targets from making the best decision possible. If target agents are informed, they will
choose the preferred alternative policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1990).
There are two types of information regarding policy instruments: information as
and information on. One is information as a policy instrument as itself. The other is
“metapolicy instrument” which is used to convey the knowledge of other policy
instruments’ existence, availability, and meaning (Vedung, 1998). Vedung (1998) calls
10

Schneider and Ingram (1990) defined information, training, and education as capacity tools. Vedung
(1998) used the term “sermons,” and OECD (1994) called it as “suasive instrument.”
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the latter type of information, “information on policy instruments.” Information
instruments are regarded as modern forms of governmental intervention and the least
coercive instruments, which is called a sermon or exhortation (Vedung, 1998). This paper
deals with both types of information—information on policy instruments and as policy
instruments, which influence electricity generation from renewable sources and classify
them into information instruments.
Stavins (2003) argues that information programs help economic instruments more
effectively solve the environmental problems because they empower producers and
consumers to make rational choices. Well-informed producers and consumers constitute
a crucial characteristic of well-functioning markets. This study discusses two types of
information programs. One is product labeling requirements which provide consumers
the information set. According to the reporting requirements, producers must make their
products’ information and manufacturing process publically available. Reported
information helps increase public awareness of producer’s activities and prompts the
producers to operate more transparently (Stephan, 2002).
Information instruments complement other policy instruments by helping people
understand and interpret other policy instruments. Information instruments encourage
people to comply with regulations or take advantage of available services (Weiss, 2002).
Based on the discussion above, this study hypothesizes a positive correlation
between a state’s use of information instruments and the likelihood of developing more
renewable energy. In addition, information instruments in conjunction with other policy
instruments are expected to push the deployment of states’ renewable electricity.
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2.2.3 Policy Mixes
Direct regulation or command-and-control instruments were the predominant
means of government intervention in environmental policy until the 1990s. In recent
years, however, shortcomings of direct regulation such as diminishing effectiveness and
increasing costs have prompted neoliberal ideas to gain a larger influence over
environmental policy and natural resources management. A wider range of policy
instruments has been proposed as regulatory alternatives (Baldwin and Cave, 1999;
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; OECD, 2002). They include process-based regulation,
economic instruments, financial incentives, information disclosure, self-regulation, and
voluntarism (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Cho, 2008). New market-based
environmental policy instruments have been viewed more favorably. Economic or
market-based instruments incentivize polluters/target population to act in ways stipulated
by policy goals. Economic incentives are considered to be more flexible and costeffective instruments compared to traditional command-and-control instruments (Bailey,
2007; Bernstein, 1993).
Interest in “policy mixes,” or combining policy instruments, has been increasing
since the 1990s (OECD, 2001; Persson, 2006; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). The following
reasons account for the preference for a policy design combining different types of policy
instruments over a single instrument. Combined policy instruments complement and
reinforce each other to enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of policy
implementation compared to a single instrument (Rist, 1998). In reality, environmental
problems tend to be too complex to solve with a single strategy (Gunningham and
Sinclair, 1999). Selecting the most appropriate combination of instruments comprises a
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crucial component of a policy design that would maximize the goal achievement and
minimize political economic costs (Peters, 2002).
2.3 Classification of Renewable Energy Policies
This section reviews the policies and incentives that state governments in the U.S.
developed to promote electricity generation and distribution from renewable sources.
These are 18 state renewable energy policy instruments and incentives which are
classified into three categories of policy instruments: command-and-control, marketapproach, and information instruments. These three policy instruments are derived from
both the previous literature that categorizes renewable energy policies and the general
policy instruments classification. Categorization of the renewable energy policy
instruments, adopted in the United Sates at the state level, enables one to trace the trends
of how the United States has employed its policies for promoting renewable energy over
the past decade.
Classification of renewable energy policies is conducted based on the criteria
discussed in the previous section. Policies that use authoritative tools to motivate people
to respond to and comply with policy goals belong in the category of command-andcontrol instruments. Market-based instruments are policies and programs that motivate
and incentivize people with tangible trade-offs. Information instruments attempt to
influence people to act voluntarily by knowledge transfer and communication.
Some previous empirical studies (Beck and Martinot, 2004; Enzensberger, et al.,
2002; Jonstone, Hascic, and Popp, 2008; Menz, 2005) classify renewable energy policies
and programs into several groups. These groups trace state governments’ policy design
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trends. Enzensberger, et al. (2002) divide legislative instruments for renewable energy
development into regulatory and economic instruments. In addition, they distinguish
economic instruments into supply-push and demand-pull approaches in the context of
renewable energy fostering projects. A supply-push approach includes renewable energy
policy instruments that influence the electricity price or production costs of renewable
electricity (feed-in tariffs, tax advantages, subsidies for investment). Demand-pull
approach fixes a certain demand—i.e. a certain percentage of the total electricity
generation (or consumption) from renewable—by obliging market industry
(Enzensberger et al., 2002).
Menz (2005) describes state level renewable energy policies with three
distinctions based on the means and degree of authoritative intervention: state financial
incentives, state rules and regulations, and voluntary measures. Beck and Martinot (2004)
and Jonstone, Hascic, and Popp (2008) also classify renewable energy policies into three
categories: price-setting and quantity-forcing policies (RPS, REC), investment cost
reduction policies (rebate, tax relief, grant, loan), and public investment and market
facilitation activities (PBFs, industry support, contractor certification, equipment
standards, disclosure, access laws, government procurement). These categories differ
from Menz’s (2005) in that the function of each instrument defines them.
This study overviews states’ policies in support of renewable energy development
and classifies those individual policies into three categories—command-and-control,
market-based approach, and information instruments. The defining features used to
classify renewable energy policies are the degree of authoritative forces (Vedung, 1998;
OECD, 1994; Salamon, 2002) combined with the behavioral assumptions that determine
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the relationship between government and target population (Vedung, 1998; Schneider &
Ingram, 1990).
2.3.1 Command-and-Control
In this study, five renewable energy policies or programs are identified as the
command-and-control instruments: (1) green power purchasing programs, (2) renewable
portfolio standards, (3) public benefit funds, (4) interconnection, and (5) contractor
licensing.
Green Power Purchasing Programs
Many state and local governments purchase a certain percentage of their
electricity consumption from renewable sources or buy renewable energy credits (RECs).
Governments, businesses, schools, residents, and NPOs can enter into contracts with
green power marketers or developers through utility green power programs or community
aggregation (DSIRE, 2010). No mandates for governmental units to consume their
electricity from renewable sources existed before 2000. As of October 2010, nine states
had green power purchasing programs, while the federal government had a green powerpurchasing goal. This program entails government entities directly purchasing renewable
energy. State governments, through authority bested in them, also set the amount or
percentage of the consumption of electricity generated from renewable sources. The
green power purchasing program carries high degree of coerciveness.
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Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)
RPSs require electric utilities to own or acquire renewable energy or renewable
energy credits (RECs) to account for a certain percentage or amount of its generating
capacity or retail electricity sales according to a specific timeframe. Only six states had
adopted RPS with mandatory or voluntary goals in 1998. As of August 2010, 29 states
and the D.C. had legally binding RPSs, seven of which had renewable portfolio goals.
Today, RPS is considered the most important and popular policy to promote renewable
energy development at the state level. Numerous previous literatures have described RPS
as a “market-friendly” policy instrument (Wiser, Namovicz, Gielecki, and Smith, 2007).
RPS, however, is closer to a command-and-control type of policy instrument because it
restricts eligible renewable technologies and requires electricity producers to adopt a
specific technology to increase supply and/or demand of renewable energy (Delmas and
Montes-Sancho, 2011). In regard to the quantity-based obligation set by states, the RPS is
defined as a command-and-control type of policy instrument with a high degree of
coerciveness.11 Since RPS includes few market dimensions, the key to policy success
depends on policy implementation and enforcement (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).
RPS is relatively easy to implement in terms of political dimension because its effect
starts after its enactment/adoption.

11

Use of tradable renewable energy credits in the process of RPS implementation is considered a marketbased mechanism to provide flexibility and compliance costs.
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Public Benefit Fund (PBF) / System Benefit Charge (SBC)
During the state level electric utility restructuring in the late 1990s, public benefit
funds (PBFs) were developed through a surcharge on electricity consumption and were
used for rebate and loan programs, R&D, and energy education programs (DSIRE, 2010;
Doris, McLaren, Healey, and Hockett, 2009). The PBF is categorized as a command-andcontrol instrument in this study. The states impose a certain amount of surcharge on all
consumers of electricity and re-allocate the collected funds between renewable energy
and energy efficiency. Therefore, public benefit funds are more likely considered a social
regulation rather than an economic policy instrument. Among the 18 states and D.C. that
implement PBFs as of August of 2010, 14 states had already created PBF before 2000
(EPA, 2007; Doris, et al., 2009).
Contractor Licensing
As of October 2010, 15 states have adopted and implemented contractor licensing
requirements for renewable energy development (DSIRE, 2010). Contractors who want
to install renewable energy can get specific licensing, which guarantees proper
installation and maintenance of renewable energy by standardizing the contractors’
experience and knowledge. Beck and Martinot (2009) explain that certificate requirement
policy, such as contractor licensing, improves the efficiency of the renewable energy
systems by ensuring uniform quality of equipment installation. However, there has been
limited impact analysis on it so far. Contractor licensing is a typical command-andcontrol policy instrument. Twelve states granted contractor licenses in 1998, and 15 states
have currently implemented licensing.
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Interconnection Standards
Interconnection standards are a process standard which falls under the commandand-control type of policy instrument. The standards control the technical and procedural
process through which customers connect to electricity grids. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopts standards for the transmission level, while the
state public utility commissions (e.g. PUCO) establish standards for interconnection to
the distribution grids (DSIRE, 2010).
In 1999, six states implemented interconnection standards. Over the last decade,
most of the U.S. states have adopted interconnection standards (43 states and D.C. as of
August 2010). Interconnection standards can remove market barriers to renewable energy
development, and their design and implementation ensure a stable, safe, and economical
connection to the electricity grid.
2.3.2 Market-Based Instruments
Financial incentives reduce the initial cost or the operating cost of renewable
technologies in order to make renewable technologies more attractive than conventional
technologies (Menz and Vachon, 2006).12 Eleven programs and incentives for renewable
energy development were placed in the market-based approach instruments in this study:
net-metering, rebates, grants, loans, production incentives, and five tax expenditures.

12

Conventional technologies for electricity generation have relatively low capital costs and high operating
costs, whereas capital costs of renewable electricity sources are relatively high while its operating costs are
low.
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Net-Metering
Net-metering allows for electricity to flow from and to the customer. Electricity
from the customer flows back to the grid when customers generate electricity that
exceeds their consumption: this offsets electricity consumed by the customer because it
uses the excess generation (DSIRE, 2010). Net-metering is considered a market-based
policy instrument in this study because net-metering creates a niche market for on-site
renewable energy generation, benefiting the customer (Forsyth, Tu, and Gilbert, 2000).
Under PURPA of 1978, electricity consumers in states without net-metering programs
have little financial incentives to invest in renewable energy systems: small wind or solar
electric system owners were considered qualifying facilities, and were paid only utilities’
avoided fuel cost for their excess generation. Despite variation in the treatment of
consumers’ net excess generation among states, states with net-metering can buy back net
excess generation at higher rates, from wholesale to retail rates, than in states without netmetering (Forsyth, et al., 2000). This creates more attractive financial incentives to
consumers to produce electricity through grid-connected renewable energy systems.
While only 21 states had adopted the net-metering system in 1998, 43 states and D.C.
implemented net-metering policies as of October 2010. Many states adopted rules for net
metering for renewable energy systems as part of the states’ electric-industry
restructuring.
Renewable Energy Access Laws
Solar and wind access laws are established to protect a right to install and operate
renewable energy systems at homes or facilities. Some states protect the property rights
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to solar access through legislation13. Others allow parties to voluntarily enter into solar
easement contracts. UNEP (2004) considers property rights as being resident in the
spectrum of economic instruments. Property rights constitute a baseline for the
functioning of many economic instruments and also serve as an environmental instrument.
May (2002) defines property rights as economic instruments used to implement social
regulation. Fourteen states had implemented access laws in 1998, and 39 states have
established renewable energy access laws as of August 2010.
Rebate Programs
Rebates programs provide the funding for solar or photovoltaic systems to
promote the installation of renewable energy systems. As of August 2010, 27 states and
D.C. had state-level rebate programs. As a market incentive, rebates reduce the cost of
renewable energy installations. Rebates are flexible to the market changes because they
represent relatively short-term policies to a specific project.
Grant Programs
States provide grant programs to assist the installation of equipment or systems by
lowering the cost or encouraging the R&D of renewable technologies. Grant programs
are available for the commercial, industrial, utility, education and government sectors. In
1998, 12 states operated grant programs for renewable energy development. By 2010, 22
states had grants as economic incentives. Grants are considered a market approach
instrument, as they reduce high up-front costs with renewable energy installations and
thus help small, customer-sited projects.

13

Such as Arizona and Delaware
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Loan Programs
Most of the states—to be exact, 42 states—use state loan programs to finance the
purchase of renewable energy systems or equipment. Loan rates and terms are
determined on an individual project basis.
Renewable Energy Production Incentives
Production incentives, or performance-based incentives (PBIs), provide cash
payments based on the amount of electricity generated by a renewable energy system.14
Only one state had production incentives in 1998, and fourteen states have implemented
performance-based incentives as of August 2010.15
Tax Expenditures: Corporate, Industry, Personal, Property, and Sales Tax Incentives
States offer five categories of tax incentives for renewable energy development:
corporate, industry, personal, property, and sales tax incentives. Corporate tax incentives
are available when corporations purchase and install renewable energy and equipment.
States offer industry tax credits, exemptions, or grants to recruit or develop renewable
energy systems and equipment. States offer personal income tax credits and deductions to
reduce the expenses of buying and installing renewable energy systems. Property tax
incentives exclude the additional cost of the renewable energy system more than a
conventional heating system in the property assessment. Sales tax incentives provide an
exemption from or refund of the state sales tax for the purchase of renewable energy
systems. Tax incentives have been adopted since the early stage of renewable energy
14

The “feed-in tariff” is a production incentive. Payments based on actual performances are more effective
to ensure project quality.
15
There is a federal renewable energy production incentive (REPI) established in 1992.
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development. More than half of all states currently provide mixed tax expenditure as
market instruments.
Tax expenditures or abatements can be important for renewable energy
developers because renewable energy facilities are usually capital-intensive and financial
incentives from tax abatements help developers to make decision to build and invest
energy facilities. However, those tax exemptions may not be sufficient to stimulate new
renewable energy development (Bird, et al., 2005). This is because a one-time tax benefit
at the time of equipment purchase or installation is not sufficient for developers to decide
investment for new facilities. Also, there is a concern regarding the use of tax exemptions
due to possible reduction in tax revenues, which may interfere with the local economic
development (Bird et al. 2005).
2.3.3 Information Policy Instrument
Required Green Power Option
Green power option requires and encourages electric utilities to offer customers
the options of purchasing electricity generated from renewable resources at a premium
above market electricity rate. Before 2000, no states had implemented green power
options, and eight states had mandatory utility green power options as of October 2010
(DSIRE, 2010). The most common example of a green power option involves allowing
customers to make voluntary contribution (Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). Consumers
contribute a premium for the amount of renewable power purchased.16 This type of green
power option is called “voluntary renewable energy tariffs.” In the other case, utilities

16

The premium is usually about $2 per 100kWh (Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).
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charge consumers a higher electricity rate to cover the additional cost for renewable
power generation. Utilities typically provide green power owned by the utility or
purchased under contract. This research classifies the required green power option as a
type of information instrument. This is because it provides customers the knowledge that
they can support renewable energy generation and thus allows consumers to voluntarily
pay additional cost for this knowledge. Consumer purchase and demand for renewable
electricity can contribute to renewable energy development. The premiums paid by
consumers for green power can serve as a revenue stream to support investment in and
operation of renewable energy facilities and technologies (Bird, et al., 2005). Shrimali
and Kniefel (2011) show that states which require utilities to give their customers green
power options are likely to increase renewable energy capacity.
Generation Disclosure or Environmental Disclosure Policies
Electric utilities are required to provide customers information on fuel mix
percentages and related emissions. Generation disclosure allows customers to make
informed choices on electricity and the provider they choose. Seven states had generation
disclosure in 1998. As of May 2009, 22 states and D.C. have required some forms of
generation disclosure (DSIRE, 2009).17 At the firm level, mandatory disclosure programs
have statistically significant impact on the increase of the firms’ proportion of electricity
generation attributable to renewable sources (Delmas, Monte-Sancho, and Shimshack,
2010).

17

Twenty one states have full disclosure requirements and three state and D.C. have partial disclosure
requirements, and three states have proposed and pending requirements as of June, 2010 (U.S. DOE 2010).

34

2.3.4 Summary of Renewable Energy Policy Instruments
Table1 offers a snapshot of classification result of currently adopted and
implemented renewable energy policies at the state level. Based on the tri-fold
classificatory scheme of policy instruments, this study classifies the 18 state legislative
renewable energy policies and programs into three categories—command-and-control,
market approach, and information policy instruments. In addition, under each group of
policy instrument, renewable energy policies and programs are grouped or subcategorized by the virtue of each illustrative tool 18 for better understanding of the
classification criteria and rationale.
As of 2010, state governments used five types of command-and-control
instruments are being used by state governments: renewable portfolio standards (RPS),
green power purchasing programs, public benefit funds (PBF), contract licenses, and
interconnection standards. Among these five policy instruments, RPS, PBF, and green
power purchasing programs are identified as obligations because state governments
mandate and enforce their setting policy goals on electric producers or governmental
agencies through coercive and authoritative tools. Interconnection standards and
contractor licenses are grouped separately as process standards.
For the intervention in electric power markets, states have diversified marketoriented policy instruments. State governments currently use eleven kinds of policies,
programs or financial support that are designed to motivate electric producers to employ

18
Salamon (2002) uses the term, “tool” or “instrument” interchangeably at the most descriptive level. He
defines a tool of public action as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to
address a public problem.” Salamon (2002) calls them “illustrative tools” and groups them together based
on various criteria such as degree of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, visibility, etc.
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more renewable energy technologies. This study places net-metering programs and
access laws under the policy instrument of market approach and identifies them as
economic regulations that lower market barriers and assure property rights for the new
developers entering the market. One of the most popular tools adopted by states is
providing financial incentives to the power suppliers. State governments offer various tax
expenditures such as sales, property, personal, and corporate tax abatements for the
purchase or installation of renewable energy equipment. States also award grants or loan
electric power producers for their investment in renewable energy development. Using
the market approach, governments can render the electricity market environment more
favorable for energy developers. However, the actors ultimately have to take
responsibility in taking advantage of given incentives when making their decisions.
Increasing numbers of states have adopted a new type of policy instrument;
information to alter the behavior of electric power suppliers. Some states require
electricity suppliers to inform customers about the sources of energy or the amount of
greenhouse gas emission. The other informative instrument that state governments
encourage power companies to offer is green power options. Intellectual and moral
appeals baseline these two informative instruments.
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Table 1. Renewable Energy Policies in Three Types of Policy Instruments
Policy Instruments

Renewable Energy Policies and
Programs

Illustrative Tools19

Green Power Purchasing
Command
-andControl
(5)

Obligations

Renewable Portfolio Standard
Public Benefit Fund
Contractor License

License/process
standard

Interconnection
Net-Metering
Access Laws

Market Systems

Rebates
Market-based
(11)

Subsidies and grants

Grants
Loans
Production Incentives
Personal Tax Credit
Corporate Tax Credit

Tax expenditures

Sales Tax Credit
Property Tax Credit
Industry Support

Information
(2)

Required Green Power Option

Information

Disclosure

Source: by Author

19
Salamon (2002) uses the term, “tool” or “instrument” interchangeably at the most descriptive level. He
defines a tool of public action as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to
address a public problem.” Salamon (2002) calls them as “illustrative tools” and groups them together
based on various criteria such as degree of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, visibility, etc.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the empirical studies on renewable energy policies. The body
of literature consists of (1) studies estimating the effects of states’ renewable energy
policies and (2) studies on policy instrument adoption, which identify circumstances
under which state governments adopt certain mixes of policy instruments. Recently there
has been an increasing research using econometric methods to evaluate the effectiveness
of states’ renewable energy policies. A majority of previous empirical studies focus on
individual programs and policies, an effort to estimate the relationship between particular
individual renewable energy policies and increase of renewable energy. However, this
paper is more focused on the aggregate level of policy instruments that state governments
adopt for promoting renewable energy. Though literature review, this section builds the
research hypotheses with dependent and independent variables. This section reviews how
previous studies quantify the variation in policy instruments adopted, identify and
measure other variables.
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3.1 Empirical Studies on Renewable Energy Policies
Among various goals of renewable energy policies, this study focuses on the
effectiveness of renewable energy policies pertaining to the goal of renewable energy
promotion. This section reviews a body of empirical studies that evaluate the
effectiveness of renewable energy policy. The body of literature includes previous
studies that operationalized and measured the outcome of renewable energy policies.
Also, in order to evaluate the marginal effect of different types of policy instruments, this
section also reviews other determinants of renewable energy development discussed in
previous studies.
Menz and Vachon (2006) compared the impact of policy implementation for wind
energy development across 37 states from 1998 to 2003 using multivariate techniques.
They analyzed the impact of five renewable electricity policies classified under three
policy regimes – financial incentives, mandatory rules, and regulatory changes – in
regards to wind potential as a variable that affects wind power development. They
constructed wind development indices measuring different dimensions of wind energy
development for empirical analysis. They used the amount of installed wind capacity, the
absolute growth in capacity between time periods of the study, and the number of large
wind energy projects observed in each state. All wind electricity development indices
showed similar results regarding wind electricity policies and wind potential in terms of
their significance and directions. Their results demonstrated that renewable energy
policies, taken all together, had a significant impact on wind energy development. RPS
and mandatory green power offering programs, within the regulatory policy regime, had a
statistically significant and positive relationship with wind power development. However,
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the retail choice was significant and negatively associated with wind power development.
The public benefit funds (PBF) and disclosure did not have significant impacts on
renewable energy development separately. There is a possible explanation that PBF
supports demand side rather than supply side of renewable energy (Menz and Vochon,
2006). The contribution of Menz and Vochon’s study (2006) was found in its finding that
particular state policies as well as a state’s natural endowment (wind potential) affect
promotion of wind energy development, a finding supported by empirical assessment. A
relatively small number of observations posed a limitation for their study.
Carley (2009) examined the effectiveness of renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
and tax incentives designed to promote renewable electricity production at the state level.
Two separate dependent variables were used to measure state-level renewable energy
development. Carley (2009) used the total amount of annual renewable electricity
generation, excluding hydropower, measured in thousands of megawatt-hours.20 Her
study also employed the renewable electricity (RE) share which was measured as
percentage of electricity generated from renewable resources, excluding hydroelectricity,
out of total state electricity generation. Different results were found depending on
outcome measures in directions and significance of the association with RPS and other
independent variables. RPS was positively related to total amount of electricity
generation from renewable sources, but was not significantly associated with the share of
renewable of total electricity. The variation in the size of renewable energy industry
among states limited the statistical model measuring total renewable electricity.

20

Electricity generation data is available from the EIA state electricity database.
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Yin and Powers (2010) measured the stringency of RPS and analyzed its impacts
on renewable energy development. They measured the development of renewable
electricity as the percentage of electricity capacity from non-hydro renewable resources
of total capacity in a state. To calculate the share of non-hydro renewable electricity
capacity, the capacity of all electric utility plants whose primary energy source was nonhydro renewables21 was counted.22 Yin and Powers (2010)’s definition of renewable
energy development excluding hydropower was supported by historic background of the
trend of renewable electricity industry. They also considered other factors such as other
renewable energy policies, electric market characteristics, and political interest in the
environment. Results showed that the existence of green power options in the power
market and states’ experience of import of electricity have consistent and positive
impacts on the investment in renewable energy technologies.
Since the first commercial electricity-generating plant that used hydro power
began its operation in 1882, the hydroelectricity’s potential has increased considerably in
the U.S. Hydro power accounted for over 30% of total U.S. electricity generation in the
1950s. The relative importance of hydropower, however, has decreased with increasing
concerns about the environmental impacts of hydroelectric facilities and with
advancement in alternative innovations in renewable energy technologies other than
hydroelectricity. As of 2007, the share of hydro power of total electricity generation was
about six percent (EIA, 2009)23.

21

Non-hydro renewable technology includes wind, geothermal, solar, and biomass.
Utility level data on energy capacity by energy sources is obtained from EIA-906.
23
Derived from Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, 2008; Electric Power Annual,
2009.
22
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Instead, non-hydro renewable resources have been of interest to policy makers
aiming to develop a variety of policies promoting the use of non-hydro renewable in
electricity generation. As of 2010, total net generation of electricity from non-hydro
renewables or other renewables is 167,173 thousand MWh, which accounts for 4.1% of
total U.S. net generation (EIA, 2013 State Power Monthly). There are considerable
variations among states, ranging from less than 1% to more than 24% (EIA, 2013 State
Renewable Energy). The absolute amount of electricity generation from non-hydro
renewable energy has been increasing since 1990—except for a one-year decrease of
non-hydro renewable electricity generation between 2000 and 2001. The growth rate of
electricity generation from non-hydro renewable has been considerably increasing
considerably since 2001.
This study employs two operational definitions of renewable energy development
in states. Each is modeled as an effect of renewable energy policies. One is the amount of
net generation of electricity from non-hydro renewable energy sources; the other is the
relative use of renewables in electricity production, which means the share of non-hydro
renewables in electricity generation in states.
The share of non-hydro renewables is used because the relative use of non-hydro
renewables in electric power production is not always proportional to the absolute
amount of the electricity generated from renewable sources in the states. For instance,
Maryland and Massachusetts experienced a decline in the total MWh of electricity
production from renewable sources between 2006 and 2010, but the proportion of
renewable sources used in electricity generation increased for the same period due to the
overall decrease in electricity production in two states.
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With two different variables, this study aims to provide compelling evidence of
the effectiveness of public policy instruments as well as to examine the determinants of
absolute and relative use of renewable energy technologies in electricity markets
respectively. Energy Information Administration provides data on annual net generation
of electricity by state by source.24
3.2 Determinants of Renewable Energy Development
In order to isolate the effects of policy instruments (or the marginal increase of the
effects from policies) on states’ renewable energy development, alternative explanations
have to be considered and factored in as control variables. This paper looks at the types
of state governments’ policy instruments as an important determinant of variation in
renewable electricity generation between states. The effectiveness of different policy
instruments varies depending on the nature of not only the instrument, but also the
circumstances (Salamon, 2002). This study therefore considers the different state
characteristics which are assumed to influence electricity generation from renewable
sources from the previous studies. As determinants of renewable energy generation, this
study includes state’s policy instruments for renewable energy development, natural
resources, state economy, political environment, and electricity market condition.
3.2.1 Renewable Energy Policy Instruments
Recently, numbers of empirical studies that evaluate the effectiveness of
renewable energy policies have increased (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho,
2011; Menz and Vachon, 2006; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011; Yin and Powers, 2010).

24

Energy Information Administration. State Renewable Energy, 2007; State Electricity Profiles, 2009.
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These studies, however, have tended to focus on the effect of particular renewable energy
regulation such as renewable portfolio standards (Carley, 2009; Yin and Powers, 2010);
measure individual renewable energy programs and examine the relationship between
each program and renewable energy development (and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Menz and
Vachon, 2006; Delmas Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).25 A dichotomous variable is
typically employed to measure an individual policy implementation in the majority of
previous literature. Each renewable energy program such as renewable portfolio
standards and mandatory green power option is measured as the value of “1” if a state has
that policy in a given year (or prior to a certain year) and “0” if otherwise (Carley, 2009;
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Menz and Vachon, 2006; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).
This binary variable that measures the presence of individual renewable policies
however cannot capture the policy implementation of states at an aggregate level
pertaining to policy instruments. This study aims to measure the trifold scheme of policy
instruments comparable to each other in order to examine the variation of policy
effectiveness between policy instruments and their synergetic (interaction) effects of
policy mixes instead of individual programs. However, there is a lack of empirical studies
that classify and measure the entire range of individual programs and incentives in a
certain issue into types of policy instruments in the purpose of comparison of
effectiveness between them. Persson (2006) states, “Identifying instruments may involve
problems of aggregation, in that it may be unclear what constitutes a single instrument
and what measures are sub-components of an instrument. Consistency in the
identification exercise is the only way to overcome this problem.” In this respect, this
25

Carley (2009) and Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) incorporate financial incentives in their analysis to
control the effects of other renewable energy policies than their primary policy variables.
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study is to develop aggregate indices to measure the magnitude and diversity of policy
instruments.
3.2.2 Other determinants
Natural Resources
Renewable energy resources are assumed to partially explain the variation in
renewable energy production between states (Bird et al., 2005). The natural potential of
renewable energy resources – solar, wind, and biomass, etc. – is geographically-oriented,
idiographic, and not transportable between states. Renewable energy resources are one of
the important factors for the success of renewable energy policy implementation. Even
though not all renewable energy potential can be developed due to economic and physical
limitations, technical potential of renewable energy allows estimating available
renewable sources and costs of renewable resources (Deyette, Clemmer, and Donovan,
2003).
Renewable energy sources are spread out unevenly across the country. The Great
Plains, from the east of the Rocky Mountains to the west of the Mississippi River in the
U.S. have a vast potential of wind energy (Business Wire, 2004). The West and
Southwest regions of the U.S. have high quality solar radiation, the greatest solar
insolation in the U.S., so that solar power can be effectively generated in those regions
(EIA, 1993). Electricity production using biomass is highly site-specific and regionally
concentrated. This is because the location, quantities and prices of biomass resources
determine the potential for biomass power and most of biomass resources are used in the
easternmost or westernmost States (EIA, 1993).
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For the electricity generation from wind sources, wind speed is critical because
wind power density, the amount of energy in the wind, is proportional to the cube of wind
speed (Center for Sustainable Systems, 2012). The effectiveness of solar power,
conversion to electricity, varies depending on the intensity of solar radiation. Biomass
power is generated from trees, agricultural good and feed crops and wastes, wood and
animal wastes and residues, and municipal wastes and other waste materials. Through
direct-combustion equipment, co-firing in coal fired boilers and fuel cell systems,
biomass can be converted to energy and fuel. Therefore, renewable energy resources
given to each region or state are expected to explain the adoption and the implementation
of states’ renewable energy policies (Delmas and Montes, 2011; Haar and Theyel, 2006).
The association between states’ renewable energy resources and renewable
energy capacity or renewable energy generation has been analyzed (Carley, 2009;
Delmas and Montes, 2011; Russo, 2003). However, there are inconsistent results found in
previous empirical studies. Also, different types of renewable energy sources show
different relationships to states’ renewable energy development. States with higher solar
and wind potential were likely to adopt a regulatory renewable energy policy – the
renewable portfolio standards (RPS), higher potential of biomass was negatively related
to RPS adoption (Delmas and Montes, 2011). Solar potential showed significant and
positive impacts on renewable energy electricity generation, while wind and biomass
potential were negatively related to renewable energy generation (Carley, 2009). In terms
of wind energy potential, until 2006, states’ natural endowment did not show a linear
association with RPS adoption rates and renewable energy generation (Carley, 2011).
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Most of those previous studies used time-invariant measures of natural resources,
which would be helpful to understand between-states differences in natural endowment
and the impact on renewable energy policy adoption and/or renewable electricity
generation. However, state-fixed and time-invariant measures have limitations that they
cannot account for the degree to which the given potential of natural resources in a state
contributes to electricity generation from renewable sources in the electric power industry.
In order to look at the association of natural endowment and renewable energy
deployment of states, this study uses time-variant measures of wind and solar potentials.
The assumption is that a state can generate more renewable electricity when more natural
resources are available.
State Economic Characteristics
States’ economic factors play significant roles in electricity production and supply.
It is hypothesized that a wealthy state has the ability to invest more in environmentally
friendly projects (Ringquist, 1994; Sapat, 2004). Some empirical analyses show that
states with greater wealth, measured as per capita gross state product, show more
renewable energy generation and a higher percentage of renewable energy generation
(Carley, 2009). There are, however, different results about the relationship between state
wealth and renewable energy capacity. Various indicators are used to measure state
wealth in previous studies such as per capita Gross State Product (GSP) (Shrimali and
Kniefel, 2011), per capita income (Delmas and Monte-Sancho, 2010), or median
household income (Yin and Power, 2010). In previous studies, however, electricity
generating capacity from renewable sources did not have statistically significant
association with above mentioned variables measuring state wealth (Delmas and Monte47

Sancho, 2010; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011; Yin and Power, 2010). It implies that the
amount of electricity capacity does not seem to reflect the state’s economic
characteristics. This is because nameplate capacity of renewable electricity is rated by
manufacturers as the amount of capacity that generators26 produce under ideal conditions.
Net generation of electricity, however, could vary depending upon various conditions.
This study, therefore, expects that the more state wealth increases, the more electricity
will be generated from renewable sources.
States’ population growth is considered to affect the state demand for renewable
electricity in either direction. A large population growth of a state can increase the
renewable electricity generation in the respect that renewable resources may be an option
for meeting rising demand. On the other hand, increasing demand for electricity because
of a large population growth may increase electricity generation from fossil fuel due to its
lower cost. Empirical studies (Carley, 2009), however, do not find a significant
relationship between population growth and renewable energy development.
Economic interest groups are involved in the policy process and implementation,
and affect the ultimate outcomes of policy implementation. Manufacturing and mining
industries are considered to be obstacles to pro-environmental legislation because
environmental policies increase the cost of their industry or reduce the demand for their
products (Sapat, 2004; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Regarding renewable energy promotion,
producers in coal and natural gas industries and other industries related to fossil fuels can
be interest groups lobbying pressure to states’ policy making and implementation process
(Carley, 2009; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Hence, the presence of sizable stakeholder
26

Which includes a generator, turbine, transformer, transmission circuit, station, or system (EIA Glossary).
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groups which view renewable energy policies as negative propositions would detract the
governmental support and regulations for renewable energy deployment and adversely
influence the improvement of renewable electricity markets. In practice, when Ohio
passed its “Energy Bill” (S.B. 221), in 2008, the Ohio Manufacturing Association first
opposed the legislation, then lobbied later to change the contents. Especially in regards to
renewable energy policies, fossil fuel manufacturing industries are one of the biggest
stakeholders who are influenced by policy adoption and implementation. Interest groups
based on fossil fuel manufacturing and mining industries, therefore, are expected to be
negatively associated with renewable energy deployment in a state (Carley, 2009;
Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). The strength of fossil fuel based interest groups have been
measured by the percentage of gross state product pertaining to fossil fuel related
industries (Carley, 2009).
Political Environment
The comparative public policy literature and policy choice theory enables
consideration of states’ contextual factors driving variations in policy instruments choice
(Berry and Berry, 1990; Daley and Garand, 2005; Feiock and West, 1993; Howlett, 2004).
Policy instrument choice is not politically neutral and intervened by policy activities. A
political environment not only affects instrument choice, but also the ultimate policy
implementation (Peters, 2002). To evaluate policy instruments, therefore, political factors
shaping policy instrument choice should be considered. Accordingly political
environment has been measured by the preferences of state legislators and the nature of
the constraints in the implementation process (Clark and Whitford, 2011; Daley and

49

Garand, 2005; Bressers 1998; Bressers and O’Toole, 1998; Schneider and Ingram,
1990).27
In consideration of these theories, recent empirical studies evaluating the
effectiveness of renewable energy policies incorporate variables that represent states’
political environment related to adoption and implementation of renewable energy
policies (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). States’ political environment
has been operationalized with a variety of different variables. The presences of a
democratic governor and majority democratic representatives have been shown to be
positively associated with the adoption of renewable energy policies and investment in
renewable energy infrastructure (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).
State legislators’ preferences regarding environmental policy is measured by their
voting history on environmental issues, as found in environmental scorecard of the
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 28 (Clark and Whitford, 2011; Carley, 2009;
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kneifel, 2011; Vachon and Menz, 2006).
This study assumes that renewable energy development is a subset of environmental
issues, so that a state legislators’ preference toward renewable energy policies moves in
the same direction where their commitment to overall environmental policy goes. LCV
score is the average House of Representative score of a state, which is an average of all
congressional votes by state’s representatives on environmental issues. A high LCV score
indicates that the state legislators tend to have greater preference for environmental
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Doern and Wilson (1974) argue that liberal democratic societies governments prefer to use the least
coercive instruments (Persson, 2006).
28
Scorecards range from 0 to 100, which are available from the National Conference of the State
Legislature, www.lcv.org. The LCV score is used in previous studies to measure the policy preference of
state representatives (Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Nelson, 2002).
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protection. Therefore, a state showing a high LCV rating is assumed to be more likely to
demand electricity generated from renewable resources. Previous empirical studies show
that LCV score has a positive relationship with the adoption of renewable portfolio
standards (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011) and share of renewable electricity (Carley,
2009), but is not associated with total renewable electricity capacity or generation (Carley,
2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This study hypothesizes that states with
governing bodies favorable toward environmental policies have higher rates of renewable
energy development.
In previous studies, social interest or citizen involvement in environmental groups
were considered as a factor of renewable energy policy adoption (Delmas and MontesSancho, 2011; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Environmental interest groups have increased
(Straughan and Pollak, 2008) and stood against the political influence by industry based
interest groups. The presence and strength of environmental interest groups are
considered to support the pro-environmental legislation. For the adoption and
implementation of state renewable energy policies, citizen participation in environmental
groups is expected to be positively associated with state renewable energy deployment.
The number of membership of environmental interest groups29 is used to measure the
social interest in or citizen preference toward environmental issues (Delmas and MontesSancho, 2011; Hall and Kerr, 1991; Sapat, 2004). Empirical studies have shown that
states with more participants in environmental interest groups are more likely to adopt the
renewable energy policies (Vachon and Menz, 2006), and also are likely to deploy more
29
The number of Sierra Club membership is the most common for measuring state interest in
environmental issues and strength of environmental interest groups (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011;
Hall and Kerr, 1991; Sapat, 2004). Some use a combined various environmental groups such as Sierra Club,
Greenpeace, and National Wildlife Federation together (Vachon and Menz, 2006).
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renewable energy technologies (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This study, therefore,
hypothesizes that the strength of environmental interest groups in a state is positively
related to the renewable energy deployment in the state.
Administrative institutions comprise another factor in policy adoption and
implementation. Institutions directly and indirectly structure the frame in which policies
are implemented. Therefore, once a policy is adopted, policy outcomes are affected
depending upon the capacity of administrative institutions to monitor and enforcement
the policy (Sapat, 2004). To capture the institution’s administrative capacity, proxy
measures are used such as the number of staff members in state environmental agencies
(Sapat, 2004) and the number of state and local employees in natural resource positions
(Carley, 2009). Carley (2009) analyzed the impact of institutional capacity on
deployment of renewable energy. Her results showed that the share of renewable
electricity is positively associated with, but state net generation of renewable electricity is
negatively associated with, the number of state and local natural resource staff members.
This study expects that renewable energy generation of a state is positively related to the
number of state and local governments’ employees working for the function of natural
resources.
Market Conditions of Electric Power Industry
In the United States, the utility services of electricity generation, transmission and
distribution have been traditionally operated by market systems. Hence, the electricity
generation from renewable sources should be at least partially determined by the supply
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and demand equilibrium under the given conditions and characteristics of electricity
markets.
One factor assumed to affect renewable electricity deployment is natural gas price
and/or electricity price (Birds, et al., 2005; Carley, 2009; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). It
is arguable, however, whether or not natural gas and/or electricity prices determine
increases in renewable electricity generation. Some have argued that high natural gas
prices are positively associated with renewable electricity generation. This is because
high wholesale prices of natural gas make renewable energy relatively competitive and
cause electric producers to shift to use of relative cost competitive alternative energy
(Bird, et al., 2005; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). For instance, the Western energy crisis is
associated with the imbalances of supply and demand of electricity sources, especially
natural gas (Bird, et al., 2005; Weare, 2003). California State thereafter has emphasized
the importance of renewable energy and diversification and dependence of energy
sources (Weare, 2003). There is another argument that the higher the price of electricity,
the less likely consumers and/or electric utilities will want further investment in relatively
expensive renewable sources for electricity generation. Instead, electric generators may
switch the source of electricity generation from natural gas to cheaper fossil fuel (Carley,
2009; EIA, 2009; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). Empirical studies show inconsistent
results. Carley’s study (2009) showed a negative association between the share of
renewable energy and retail price of electricity, but an insignificant relationship was
found between electricity price and total renewable electricity generation. Shrimali and
Kniefel (2011) included both natural gas price and electricity price in their model. They
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found that electricity price is positively and natural gas is negatively related to states’
renewable electricity capacity.
As a possible factor affecting the electricity industry’s preference towards
renewable sources, the pattern of net import/export of electricity between states is
considered (Yi and Feiock, 2012; Yin and Powers, 2010). On one hand, states which
heavily depend on importing electricity from other states may have incentives to search
for diverse alternative energy sources available within states and reduce their energy
dependence. On another hand, states that export electricity to outside states may generate
electricity exceeding their needs using relatively cheap energy sources such as coal,
natural gas, or nuclear power, and/or make profits through electricity transmission and
distribution between states. Therefore those states may not benefit from adopting
renewable energy technologies which cost a lot to start up and take longer time to gain
returns. Yin and Powers (2010) included a variable measuring the ratio of electricity
import/export in their model explaining the impact of states’ renewable portfolio
standards on the percentage of renewable electricity generating capacity. Their results
showed that states’ experience of increase in electricity import in the previous year
positively affects the electricity markets to develop renewable energy in the following
year. This study hypothesizes that the more a state imports electricity from other states,
the more the state acts to develop renewable energy. In other words, a state that exports
its electricity to other states is less likely to invest in developing renewable energy.
The existence and magnitude of nuclear power production within a state also
needs to be considered. Even though there is a continued controversy over whether
nuclear power is a form of renewable energy or not, nuclear power worldwide is expected
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to increase as concerns about greenhouse gas emission reduction and energy security
(EIA, 2011).30 Displacing electricity from coal-fired generation, together with natural gas
and renewables, nuclear power is expected to strongly advance (EIA, 2011).31 The use of
nuclear power in a nation or a state can be interpreted either ways. A country or a state
may operate nuclear power plants to substitute the source of electricity from coal to less
polluting sources. In this case the existence or magnitude of nuclear power generation in
a country or a state can be an indicator of its preference toward a diverse fuel mix or
alternative energy sources, so does non-hydro renewables (Kneifel, 2009). However, a
country or a nation’s nuclear power generation capacity may also be an impediment to
deployment of renewable energy technologies. This is because when a county or a state is
to displace its existing coal-fired generation to other sources, together with natural gas,
nuclear power and renewables would be competing alternatives. In cases like this,
existing capacity of nuclear power generation in a state could rather stand in the way of
investment in renewable energy development.
As of 2010, the United States produced 807 million megawatt hours of electricity
from nuclear power plants. Thirty one states deployed nuclear power as their source of
electricity generation and State of Illinois generated 96.2 million MWh, followed by
Pennsylvania and New York states.32 Nuclear power accounted for approximately 20% of
total electricity generation in the electric power industry in the U.S. over the last two
decades.

30

In the IEO2011 Reference case, electricity generated from nuclear power is projected to increase from
2.6 million megawatthours in 2008 to 4.9 million megawatthours worldwide (EIA, 2011, p.4).
31
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484(2011).pdf
32
Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy Source (EIA-906, EIA-920, and EIA-923),
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/
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This study includes the ownership of electric utilities as one of the organizational
strategies considered as an important variable influencing the success of implementation
of renewable energy policies. There is a body of literature on the tools of governance
(Doern and Phidd, 1983; Salamon, 2002) that considers governmental organizational
strategies as instruments or tools of governance. Organizational strategies are represented
as socialization and privatization of governing entities. Socialization is the type of
governing strategy that a government establishes or owns an organization providing
goods and services directly; the ownership or the operation of activities are transferred
from the private to the public. Privatization occurs when government transforms the
ownership or the operation of services from the public sector to private sector (Salamon,
2002). Government organizational or administrative strategy however is considered apart
from policy instruments in analytic policy instruments literature. This is because
government organization is assumed as a prerequisite for policy instrument application
rather than a kind of policy instrument (Vedung, 1998).
In most states, except Nebraska,33 investor-owned electric utilities consist of a
large portion of the total electricity industry (EIA, 1999; EIA, 2012b).34 As private
enterprises, investor-owned utilities provided about 62.6% of the total consumer base in
the country in 2010 (EIA, 2012b, p.311). Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) incorporate
the ownership of electric utilities for the first. They hypothesize that private utilities
prioritize their consumers in order to maximize their profits. On the other hand, publiclyowned utilities, which are governed by public entities such as locally elected or appointed
33

Nebraska serves its entire electricity by publicly owned or consumer owned electric power utilities.
Source: Nebraska Power Review Board (http://www.powerreview.nebraska.gov/)
34
EIA (1999), The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1999: Mergers and Other Corporate
Combinations, http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/corp_str/chapter2.html; EIA (2012), State Electricity
Profile, p.168, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/pdf/sep2010.pdf.
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officials, are assumed to be more responsive to public policies (Delmas and MontesSancho, 2011). The empirical result shows that RPS is more effective at privatized
electric utilities in terms of investment in renewable capacity compared to publicly
owned utilities (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This can be understood that private
utilities are more likely to be motivated by state renewable energy policies and utilize
market incentives. In addition, many states exempt publicly owned utilities including
municipal utilities and rural cooperatives from renewable energy standards and funds
(Deyett, et al. 2003). This study hypothesizes that a state with more private electric
utilities is more responsive to renewable energy policies.
3.3 Summary of Literature Review
By reviewing previous studies on renewable energy policies and policy
instruments, possible variables and their hypothetical directions toward dependent
variable are found. The following table summarizes the explanatory and control variables
and their expected relationship with states’ renewable electricity generation. This study
uses actual net generation of electricity from renewable sources as the measure of
dependent variable, renewable energy development. Hypothesized signs in Table 2 are
derived from previous empirical studies and also indicate the expected results of this
study.
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Table 2. Hypothetical Relationship between Explanatory Variables and State Renewable
Electricity Generation
Variables

Hypothesized Signs

Previous Studies

Command-and-Control Type of
Policy Instruments

+

Market-Based Approach

?

Information Instruments

+

-

Menz and Vachon (2005);
Carley (2009); Delmas and
Montes-Sancho (2011); Shrimali
and Kniefel (2011)
Carley (2009); Delmas and
Montes-Sancho (2011); Shrimali
and Kniefel (2011)
Delmas and Monte (2011);
Shrimali and Kniefel (2011)
Menz and Vachon (2006);
Carley (2009); Delmas and
Montes-Sancho (2011)
Carley (2009)
Sapat (2004); Vachon and Menz
(2006); Carley (2009); Shrimali
and Kniefel (2011)

+

Carley (2009); Delmas and
Montes-Sancho (2011)

Natural Resources
?
State Wealth
Industrial Interest Groups
- Manufacturing Industry
- Fossil Fuel Manufacturing and
Mining Industries
Political Environment
- Legislators’ Preference toward
Environmental Issues
- Democrat governor
Social Interest in Environmental
Issues

+

Institutional/Administrative Capacity

+

Vachon and Menz (2006);
Delmas and Montes-Sancho
(2011)
Sapat (2004); Carley (2009);

Natural Gas Price

+

Bird et al. (2005)

Electricity Price

?

Privatized Governance of Electric
Utilities
Export of Electricity

+
-

Carley (2009); Shrimali and
Kniefel (2011)
Delmas and Montes-Sancho
(2011)
Yin and Powers (2010)

Share of other power sources

?

Shrimali and Kniefel (2011)

+
+

Notes: (+) denotes positive influence, (-) denotes negative influence, and (?) denotes
indeterminate influence.

58

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

This study is designed to explore and compare the effectiveness of state
governments’ renewable energy policies classified according to a tri-fold scheme of
policy instruments, including (1) command-and-control instrument, (2) market-based
instrument, and (3) information instrument. This section presents the conceptual
framework of analysis with which the directional relationship between renewable energy
policies is identified in terms of the previously described factors and outcomes. Then, this
section specifies the research hypotheses derived from literature review including
theoretical arguments on the effectiveness of policy instruments and the prior empirical
evaluations of renewable energy policies. Next, I discuss analytical models for timeseries cross sectional data analysis in terms of the purpose of this study. This section ends
up with operational definitions and data sources of independent and dependent variables.
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4.1 Conceptual Framework
This study proposes a conceptual model with which to examine the isolated
effectiveness of each renewable energy policy instrument: command-and-control,
market-based, and information instruments. It is assumed that at least part of the variation
in renewable energy development in states is attributable to the particular set of policy
instruments adopted by state governments. This study considers several components of
alternative explanatory variables expected to affect states’ renewable energy development
based on the theoretical foundations of policy instruments and empirical results from
prior renewable energy policy studies. This study models that renewable energy
development in terms of actual electricity generation using non-hydro renewable sources.
This study excludes conventional hydro power from its definition of renewable energy
because recent state policies have aimed at supporting solar, wind, or biomass energy
technologies while conventional hydroelectric facilities begun considering
environmentally unfriendly. In addition, when including hydro power as renewables, the
overall trend of renewable electricity generation in the U.S. shows little variation over the
past decade because declining interest in conventional hydro power diminished the
increasing trend of non-hydro renewable electricity production. The research models of
the study represents the variation in total amount and/or share of electricity production
from non-hydro renewable sources as a function of states’ intervention, specific forms of
intervention include various policy instruments designed to encourage renewable energy
production and other state specific characteristics such as natural resource, state
economic factors, political environment, and the market conditions of electric power
industries in states. The conceptual model is
60

RE_GEN = f (RE_POLICY, RESOURCE, ECONOMY, POLITICS,
ELECTRIC_MARKET)

(1)

where RE_GEN represents the amount and share of electricity generated from non-hydro
renewable resources within a state;
RE_POLICY represents three policy instrument indices — command-and-control,
market incentives, and information instruments that state governments adopt to
promote renewable electricity generation;
RESOURCE represents the natural endowment of renewable energy resources;
ECONOMY represents the state’s economic forces to renewable energy industry;
POLITICS represents the state’s political and social preference toward
environmental issues and governments’ institutional capacity;
ELECTRIC_MARKET represents the characteristics of the electric power market
in a state.
Figure 2 illustrates the postulated causal directions of the dependent and
independent variables. The primary purpose of this study is to examine and compare the
effectiveness of renewable energy policy instruments. It models a directional association
of policy instruments and other factors with renewable energy development. The model
enables to statistical isolation of the marginal effect of each policy instrument, holding all
other factors constant. At the same time, this study stipulates which other control
variables are likely to impact renewable energy (RE) development. With the context of
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this model, once can find the mechanism through which factors induce the electric power
industry to produce renewable electricity under the given conditions of states.
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework of Analysis

Policy Instruments

Natural Resources

State Economy

RE Development

Political Environment

Electric Power Market

4.2 Research Hypotheses on the Effectiveness of Policy Instruments
This section introduces research hypotheses of this study. Three primary research
hypotheses are built upon aforementioned three types of states renewable energy policy
instruments: command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments. Each
hypothesis is derived from the theoretical discourse on the effectiveness of respective
policy instruments. The empirical evidence of individual renewable energy policy
instruments’ impact on renewable energy development, discussed in the literature review
section, has also contributed to the construction of each hypothesis.
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The primary purpose of this study is to discover what type of government
activities, shown by states’ policy adoption and implementation, work effectively under
the given circumstances of renewable energy markets and existing state economic and
political environments. We observed that there has been a considerable increase in
government intervention in the electric power market for renewable energy development,
measured by number of policies and programs. Nevertheless, we have given little
attention to neither how state governments got involved in the market, nor what types of
government approaches work better than others under the current setting of renewable
energy markets. Hence, this study is conducted to first examine the effectiveness of
policy approaches that state governments have taken to foster renewable energy markets ,
then explore the conditions under which the electric power industry deploys renewables.
To do so, this study grouped existing renewable energy policies based on the trifold classificatory scheme of policy instruments. The three categories of policy
instruments—command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments—enable
us to at least partially understand if a state mainly appeals to forceful or coercive policy
tools, if it offers financial incentives to the industry, or if the state persuades policy
targets by educating and informing market suppliers and consumers. Retrospective
examination of the effectiveness of additional adoption of each policy instrument can
prospectively suggest the government’s future steps regarding better development of
renewable energy production. Schneider and Ingram (1990) proposed several reasons
why policies may fail to guide people to act to accomplish policy goals: without authority
of law, incentives, and/or capacity, people do not comply with or utilize policies.
Authority, incentives, and capacity each embodied the behavioral assumption of
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command-and-control, market-based, and information policy instruments of this study,
respectively. Therefore, the existence of positive effect of a certain policy
approach/instrument is able to be interpreted that the current mechanism of the renewable
energy market needs a governments’ policy guide based on the behavioral assumption
under the pertaining policy instrument.
Although it is argued that implementation of multiple policy instruments such as a
“hybrid” of regulatory standard and financial incentives has been explored and justified
(Bennear and Stavins, 2007), examining whether or not adoption of a single type of
policy instrument is effective, all else being equal, is expected to give more meaningful
guidelines. The first hypothesis deals with the relationship between the states’ adoption
of command-and-control type policies and the increase of renewable electricity
production. Command-and-control type policy instruments, mainly represented by rules,
regulations, and standards, are considered to be effective with respect to the
accomplishment of policy goals, in general (Campbell, et al., 2004; Harrington, et al.,
2004; Weimer and Vinning, 1999).
We observed that state governments also have been increasingly applying
command-and-control policy instruments such as RPS to the electric power market for
renewable energy deployment. Without a specific policy goal or standard by the Federal
government, the states’ use of coercion as a policy tool encourage the electric industry’s
use of renewable electricity is expected to appropriately and effectively increase the
production and share of renewable electricity. Moreover, several previous empirical
studies on the effectiveness of individual renewable energy policies showed statically
positive associations between the number regulatory renewable energy policies like RPS
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and various measures of renewable energy development (Carley, 2009; Delmas and
Montes-Sancho, 2011; Menz and Vachon, 2005; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011), while a
few did not find a significant relationship between those two (Yin and Powers, 2010).
This research perceives that the state governments’ intervention in the renewable
energy market through the 2000s as an initial phase of public policy innovation and
implementation. Hence, it is expected that an introduction of command-and-control
policy instruments in the given electric markets will show a significant effectiveness in
terms of the increase in the use of renewables for electricity generation. The first research
hypothesis of this study is as follows.
H1: A state that has more command-and-control type of policy instruments is
more likely to deploy renewable sources for electricity generation.
Next hypothesis is about the effectiveness of market-based policy instruments in
the renewable electricity market. Since the 1980s, market-based policy tools like
economic incentives have been regarded important and innovative because of their
relative cost effectiveness pertaining to the flexibility given to policy target people in
implementation process (Callan and Thomas, 2004; Hammar, 2006; Harrington et al.,
2004). At the same time, however, it is uncertain that market-based policies alone will be
effective in altering people’s behavior to accomplish policy goals (Bernstein, 1993;
Hammar, 2006).
For the development of renewable electric industry, U.S. federal government has
offered financial incentives, including feed-in-tariffs and tax expenditures, before state
governments began intervening in the electric power industry. So, this study questions the
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possibility that existing electricity industry’s use of renewable sources would
significantly increase with additional introduction of economic incentives by state
governments. In addition, the analytical results of previous studies support, to some
degree, the suspicion this study carries regarding the lack of strong association between
economic incentive tools and renewable energy capacity or production in those studies
(Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). Based on
these conceptual discussion and empirical results, this study builds its second research
hypothesis that holding all others variables constant, including pre-existing standards on
renewable electricity generation, additional provision of economic incentives would not
work effectively in the current electric power market.
H2: The number of market-based instruments adopted by states will not be
associated with the increase of renewable electricity generation.
The last research hypothesis pertains to the effectiveness of information
instruments introduced by state governments. Information instruments, as defined in this
study, are relatively new and emerging policy tools, encompassing direct information or
knowledge provided by governments through policy tools to inform people about the
existence and availability of other related policies (Vedung, 1998). It is argued that
information as policy tools increases public awareness about essential policy issues and
thus helps both market producers and consumers to be well informed (Stavins, 2003;
Stephan, 2002; Weiss, 2002).
For renewable energy development, some state governments have implemented
several kinds of information instruments such as information disclosure and green power
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option programs. Recent empirical studies included these renewable energy programs in
the analysis and showed some positive effect of respective programs in the renewable
electricity industry (Delmas and Monte, 2011; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). This study
argues a positive association between a state’s adoption of information instruments and
the deployment of renewables in the existing electricity industry.
H3: A state with more information instruments is more likely to generate
renewable electricity.
The following section presents the statistical models, independent and dependent
variables, and operational definition of variables and data sources that help test the
abovementioned three major research hypotheses.
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4.3 Analytical Models
This study examines the effectiveness of renewable energy policy instruments
using longitudinal data and cross-sectional time series data. Longitudinal data gives more
information and variability, and more degrees of freedom which allows exploration of the
more issues than time-series or cross-sectional data (Baltagi, 2001; Kennedy, 2008; Park,
2011). As more longitudinal data have become available, more studies on state level
regulation and financial incentives for renewable energy development have employed
panel analyses (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kneifel,
2011; Yin and Powers, 2010). However, choosing an appropriate panel data model is not
only difficult, but also there is no one best modeling suitable to every dataset. This
section, therefore, discusses several panel models in terms of their assumptions, for the
purpose of helping to identify the appropriate model with which to estimate state-level
renewable energy policy effectiveness.
First of all, if the model used to analyze the panel data utilized in this study does
not produce heterogeneity or individual effects, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
or pooled OLS regression is appropriate and provides consistent and efficient parameter
estimates. However, OLS models applied to panel data usually violate this assumption
(due to unobserved variables fixed in sectional units or time periods) (Baltagi, 2008; Born
and Breitung, 2010). Moreover, even when OLS models are used with a dataset that
meets this assumption, use of OLS estimation still should be done with great care. This is
because pooled OLS regression assumes a constant slope and intercept regardless of state
and year, and it relies on the implicit assumption that between-year and between-state
comparisons are valid and of interest (Brüderl, 2005; Park, 2011). However, since the
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purpose of this study is to estimate the effectiveness of governmental intervention using
different types of policy instruments, under the various state-level conditions pertaining
to renewable energy development, within-state estimates are the matter of interest.
When cross-sectional time series data have heterogeneity issues, panel data
models should be considered. Here we compare random-effects and fixed-effects models
in terms of their assumptions and strength and limitations. Random-effect models assume
that individual specific characteristics (heterogeneity) are not associated with any
independent variables; that is, the variation across state is random. Also, random-effect
models assume a constant intercept and constant slopes across states (Brüderl, 2005; Park,
2011; Wooldridge, 2012). Experimental research designs would in principle allow the
investigator to appropriately estimate the effects of treatment using random-effects
estimation. However, in practice, the independent variables are likely to be associated
with state specific characteristics. Random-effects estimation is based on assumptions
about between comparisons; therefore insofar as this study focuses on the impact of
differences across states in terms of the dependent variable, random-effects estimation is
useful. To meet the assumption of the random-effects model, a research model has to
specify state-specific characteristics that may influence the independent variables (Green,
2008; Torres-Reyna, 2012). In reality, however, there is usually omitted variable bias in
the model due to unavailable variables (Baltagi, 2001; Park, 2011; Wooldrige, 2012).
Fixed-effects estimation, on the other hand, assumes state-specific characteristics
may affect the predictor and/or outcome variables. In other words, it assumes there are
time-invariant characteristics unique to the states. Hence, fixed-effects estimation allows
assessing the net effect of regressors or independent variables by removing or demeaning
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the effect of time-invariant, state-specific characteristics (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge,
2012). Different from random-effects estimation, therefore, fixed-effects models do not
affect biased due to omitted time-invariant and state-specific variables (Kohler and
Kreuter, 2009). Rather, fixed-effects models explore the cause of changes within an
entity. Any changes in the values of a dependent variable can be explained due to
variation in predictors other than space-fixed characteristics (Stock and Watson, 2003;
Wooldridge, 2012).
Based on the assumptions of pooled OLS, random-effects, and fixed-effects
models, fixed-effects estimation is most suitable to the analysis of this study for many
reasons. Because fixed-effects models allow an investigator to study the causes of
changes in outcome variables within an entity, fixed-effects estimate is useful for policy
analysis and program evaluation (Wooldridge, 2012). For analyzing the effectiveness of
renewable energy policy instruments, therefore, this study will employ a fixed-effects
model to answer the research question on whether the increase of renewable electricity
generation is attributable to variation in policy instruments adopted within state, ceteris
paribus.
A fixed-effects model is advisable in respect to considerations about its
assumption in terms of the existence of heterogeneity or individual specific effects as
well. In practice, states have many entity-fixed variables related to the adoption of policy
instruments and also to the energy production using renewable sources. For instance, the
size of land area varies between states, and this is expected to in part determine the levels
of investment and installation of renewable energy equipment. Also, under the guidelines
set by state legislation, the deployment of renewable energy is left to electric power
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industries as well as the policy designs of municipal authorities. There are a variety of
player-initiated non-legislative initiatives in the energy market, such like green pricing
and self-obligations. For instance, the state of Florida does not have a mandatory
renewable portfolio standard enacted by governmental authority; but a municipal utility,
JEA (formally Jacksonville Electric Authority), signed a memorandum with the Sierra
Club and the American Lung Association of Florida giving testimony to its commitment
of at least 7.5% of electric capacity from renewable energy sources by 2015.35 Also, there
are a variety of rebate and loan programs offered by corporations, municipalities, or
utilities to their members and consumers.
Model 1 shows the statistical models of this study using fixed-effects estimate.
This model allows us to explore the effectiveness of each type of policy instrument on
states’ renewable energy deployment; also to compare the relative explanatory power
between policy instruments.
=

+

∗

+

∗

+

+

+

Model 1

where “i” denotes a state, and “t” denotes a year of the observation;
denotes the total renewable electricity generation;

denotes intercepts;

denotes the policy instruments

indices (command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments) existing in a
state (i) in a certain year (t);
state dummy variables;

denotes other control variables;

denotes the vector of

denotes the vector of year dummy variables; and

the error term.
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Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Accessed July 26, 2013,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=FL10R&re=1&ee=0.
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denotes

Later, the analysis results section introduces the statistical and technical processes
for evaluating goodness-of-fit, comparing pooled OLS, random-effects, and fixed-effects
models. Throughout the process, the study remains focused upon verifying and
implementing the most appropriate analytical model for the panel data of this study.
4.4 Variables and Data
This study analyzes state-level observations as a unit of analysis. For the analysis,
historical state level data, from 2001 to 2010, were collected. Analyses with time series
cross sectional data or panel data were deemed most suitable for this study because panel
data allows an investigator to study on time-ordering of events and individual dynamics
of states with more informative data (Brüderl, 2005). Using pooled state-specific panel
data, therefore, increases the power of the models and improves the validity of statistical
conclusion of this study (Shadish, Cook, Campbell, 2002). This study looks at 48 states,
excluding Alaska and Hawaii, and D.C. for the time span between 2001 and 2010. This
following section presents dependent and independent variables with their operational
definitions and data sources.
4.4.1 Dependent Variables
To measure the outcomes of renewable energy policies, this study employs nonhydro renewable electricity generation, which is measured as the MWh of electricity
generated from renewable resources excluding hydropower within a state. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA) defines the non-hydro renewable resources as “other
renewables,” which include “biogenic municipal solid waste, wood, black liquor, other
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wood waste, landfill gas, sludge waste, agriculture byproducts, other biomass, geothermal,
solar thermal, photovoltaic energy, and wind”. 36
According to the hypotheses and analytic models, this study uses two separate
dependent variables. The first dependent variable is total amount of annual renewable
electricity excluding non-hydropower. The second dependent variable is share of
renewable electricity to total electricity generation. This second variable is calculated by
dividing a state’s annual amount of electricity generation from non-hydro renewable
sources by total amount of electricity generated from all sources. Data for each state’s
electricity generation are available, by energy source, between 2001 and 2010 in EIA’s
report, State Electricity Profiles (EIA, 2012b).37
4.4.2 Renewable Energy Policy Instruments
This study reviews 18 state level policies and programs supporting renewable
energy development across 48 states between 2001 and 2010. The major data sources of
renewable energy policies discussed in this study are the Database of State Incentives for
Renewable Energy (DSIRE), operated by the North Carolina Solar Center, the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), and the Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (EERE) at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DSIRE provides regulations,
policies and financial incentives related to renewable energy development.38
The purpose of this study is to examine states’ renewable energy development
derived attributable to policy instruments utilized by state governments. This study,
36

State Electricity Profiles 2009. EIA (http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/sep2009.pdf)
http://205.254.135.7/electricity/state/
38
The historical data between 2001 and 2007 on state regulations, programs and financial incentives for
renewable energy were collected through personal contact of person in the North Carolina Solar Center.
37
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therefore, classifies and measures current state level renewable energy policies to reveal
between-state-variation in policy instruments through which states favor to implement for
renewable energy development. State level policies and programs supporting renewable
energy development were classified into three types of policy instruments based on the
coerciveness and behavioral assumption that each policy or program involves. Three
categories of policy instruments are command-and-control, market-oriented, and
information policy instruments.
This study creates indices of renewable energy policy instruments. First, this
study constructs a dummy variable for each policy or program adoption, equal to one if a
state has a renewable energy policy, and equal to zero if the state does not have a
program in a given year (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). Each
individual renewable energy program or policy is equally weighted and assigned into a
group of policy instruments among three types. The command-and-control instrument
includes five renewable energy programs and its index ranges from zero to five. Eleven
renewable energy programs and incentives are assigned in the market approach
instrument, ranging from zero to eleven. The information instrument contains two
programs.39

39

For measuring policy instruments, this study had adopted a relative frequency count calculated as the
number of programs or incentives in each policy instrument adopted by each state divided by the maximum
number of programs. A relative frequency count is used as a useful measure to compare the variations of
policy adoption in different states (Meier, 1987; Ciocirlan, 2008). However, there was no difference
between absolute numbers vs. relative frequency count measures in the level of significance explaining
dependent variables.
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4.4.3 Control Variables
Natural resources
This study includes variables regarding the availability of each state’s
renewable resources such as wind, solar, and biomass potentials. Wind and solar
potentials are used as control variables affecting states’ renewable electricity generation.
Previous studies (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Menz and Vachon,
2006) employing technical potential of wind and/or solar energy of each state were
estimated by the Union of Concerned Scientists (Deyette et al., 2003) based on earlier
work by Elliott, Wendell, and Gower (1991) and Doherty (1995). These are, however,
based upon time-invariant data and are therefore not applicable in terms of fixed effect
panel analysis. Therefore, instead of using given data such as 10-year average, this paper
uses real time data provided by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
NASA’s POWER web site40 provides daily radiation and meteorological data from 1983
through near-real time. For measuring each state’s solar and wind parameters, average
annual daily measure is computed for each parameter applying average latitude and
longitude41 of states. This paper uses Average Insolation Incident on A Horizontal
Surface, measured as kWh/m2/day, to represent each state’s solar energy potential and
employ Wind Speed at 10 m Above The Surface Of The Earth (m/s) for wind potential.42
In the final models, however, solar potential is not included due to the fact that it
accounts for too small of a share of the total solar energy generated and thus may not be
appropriate to use as a part of the explanation for the observed overall changes in non40

The data are obtained from NASA's SSE and POWER, http://eosweb.larc.nasa.gov/sse/.
http://www.maxmind.com/app/state_latlon
42
http://power.larc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/solar/timeseries.cgi?email=daily@larc.nasa.gov
41
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hydro renewable energy (EIA, 2012a, p.75). A state’s given solar potential, measured by
annual average insolation incident on a horizontal surface (kWh/m2/day), varies little
over time, even though there are significant differences between states. In addition, solar
energy accounts for a very small proportion even among the electricity generated from
non-hydro renewable sources. As of 2010, 1,212 thousand megawatt hour of electricity is
generated from solar thermal and solar PV. It grew by 123% compared to the amount of
electricity generated from solar energy in 2001, 543 thousand megawatt hour, but it
accounts less than 1% of non-hydro renewable electricity (EIA, 2012b).43
State economic characteristics
This study hypothesizes a positive association between state wealth and amount
and proportion of a state’s electricity generation from renewable sources. This study
measures state wealth by per capita gross state product (GSP). Per capita real GSP data,
converted into constant 2005 dollar, are available at Bureau of Economic Analysis across
48 for the time span of this study, from 2001 to 2010.
The strength of fossil fuel based interest groups is expected to be negatively
associated with a state’s renewable energy deployment. This is measured by the
percentage of gross state product (GSP) attributable to the petroleum and coal product
manufacturing and mining industries out of total GSP of the state respectively. U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the gross domestic product by state by
industry available for the time period of this study.

43

http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#generation
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Political environment
This study hypothesizes that state legislators’ preference toward environmental
issues positively affect the renewable energy deployment of the state. In line with
previous studies (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kneifel,
2011), this study will use the scorecards offered by League of Conservation Voters
(LCV). Among various scores, the average score of states’ House of Representatives on
environmental issues of each state will be used to measure the preference of a state’s
governing body vis-a-vis renewable energy deployment. LCV scores are available on an
annual basis in the National Environmental Scorecard, provided by League of
Conservation Voters44.
The political affiliation of governors is also considered to be a factor in renewable
energy production. This study measures the presence of Democratic governors with
dummy variables as 1 if the political affiliation of governor in a state in a given year is a
democrat; as 0 if governor is Republican or Independent. The National Governors
Association provides the political affiliation of the governors of the 50 states.
Another political environment variable that this study considers is the capacity of
administrative institution. To measure states’ administrative capacity affecting renewable
energy implementation, this study uses the number of employees working for natural
resources in state and local governments (Carley, 2009). Historical statistics on
government employment are available from the Annual Survey of Public Employment
and Payroll45 at the Bureau of Census. Government employment data are provided by
44
45

http://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard/archive
http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/historical_data.html
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states, by government function. This study looks at the number of state and local
governments’ employees assigned to the government function of natural resources. This
study counts full-time equivalent (FTE) employees of state and local governments
according to each state. A state’s administrative capacity for natural resources is
measured as number of FTE public employees for natural resources per million people.46
This study includes social interest in environmental issues among the factors used
to explain the renewable energy deployment of states. This study hypothesizes that a state
with a higher level of citizen participation in environmental groups is likely to be more
supportive of the state legislation and policy implementation for renewable energy
development. This study measures Sierra Club chapter membership per 1,000 people in
each state as the degree of social interest in environmental issues. The historical statistics
of Sierra Club membership by chapter was obtained through Sierra Club Member
Services.47
Electricity market conditions
This study expects that higher fossil fuel prices, natural gas in particular, will
stimulate more electric suppliers to shift to renewable energy sources. For the analysis
this study considers only the natural gas consumed for electricity generation. In the State
Electricity Profile, EIA provides information on the fuel prices at which each state’s
electric power sector purchases its resources by fuel type such as natural gas, coal, and

46

2006 Mississippi has missing value in state and local governments’ FTE employment for natural resource.
Estimate is calculated as the average of 2005 and 2007 employees. LA 2006 state and local governments’
FTE employment for natural resource is missing.

47

Sierra Club website, http://www.sierraclub.org/contact/
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petroleum. 48 This study uses the natural gas prices measured as cents per million Btu
(British thermal unit).
Another market factor which is expected to explain the variation in renewable
energy deployment is electricity price. However, it is hard to predict the direction toward
which electricity price affect states’ investment in renewable energy technologies.
Previous studies did not show a consistent result for the relationship between electricity
price and renewable electricity generation and/or capacity (Carley, 2009; Shrimali and
Kniefel, 2011). This study will use the states’ average annual retail electricity price,
measured in cents per kilowatt-hour. EIA provides the historical electricity price data by
state, between 1990 and 2010.49
This study assumes that a state’s experience of electricity import incentivizes the
state to develop renewable energy. Yi and Feiock (2012) used the net import of electricity
from other states, in million Btu, in their study of the determinants of states’ renewable
portfolio standards adoption. Measures of variation in states’ electricity import/export
tendencies, however, should consider the relative size of the energy industries within the
respective states. Yi and Powers’ study (2010) measured states’ import ratio of electricity
by computing the net difference between electricity sales and generation divided by total
electricity sales within a state. They modeled a year lagged impact of states’ experience
in increase or decrease of electricity import ratio on renewable energy development.50
However, their measure is not only complicated to interpret, but also generates negative

48
Missing data for some states were estimated by the average natural gas prices of neighboring states
according to NERC.
49
EIA (2011). Electric Power Annual. http://205.254.135.7/electricity/data.cfm#sales
50
IMPORTRAIOit = (SALESi,t-1 – GENERATIONi, t-1) / (SALESi, t-1)
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values which do not allow possible data transformation, e.g. log transformation, for
appropriate and efficient statistical analysis.
The EIA provides states’ net interstate trade of electricity51 and net trade index of
electricity in its annual report of State Electricity Profiles.52 The net trade index is the
ratio of a state’s total supply, including electricity generation and import from other
countries, to state total use of electricity, sum of in-state consumption and international
exports. 53 EIA’s net trade index is useful in terms of looking at the overall size and
trends of states’ import and export of electricity. However, EIA’s net trade index would
be a misleading measure of states’ self-sufficiency ratio for electricity, because it
considers import from other countries as a part of states’ electricity supply.
Based on the aforementioned two indices, this study measures a state’s electricity
import/export ratio by the net generation of electricity in a state over total electricity sales
within the state. The underlying assumption is that a state exports whatever portion of its
electricity production exceeds total demand in the state. An electricity export index
bigger than unify indicates a positive net export of electricity of a state; export index
smaller than 1 refers positive net import of electricity from other states. Data for the
MWh of net generation and sales of electricity by state are provided by the Energy
Information Administration.
The type of governance of electric utility industry is measured by the ownership
of electric utilities. The ownership of utilities is expected to influence the utilization of

51

Net Interstate Trade = Total Supply - (Total Electric Industry Retail Sales + Direct Use + Total
International Exports (if applies) + Estimated Losses).
52
EIA, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/.
53
Net Trade Index is the sum of Total Supply / (Total Disposition - Net Interstate Trade).
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state governments’ financial incentives, subsidies, and tax expenditures. Energy
Information Administration issues Electric Sales, Revenue, and Average Price data by
state and utility.54 This includes class of ownership – public, cooperative, and investorowned – state location, number of consumers, revenue, sales (MWh), etc. Data are
available from 1994 to 2010. This study measures the share of private utility by the
percent of the sales sold by investor-owned utilities to total electric utility sales in each
state.
The final control variables are year dummies. To control the heterogeneity
attached to years, year dummies with 2001 reference are measured. There are some
variables which must have influenced the renewable energy industry, but which are hard
to allocate to states, such as federal efforts for renewable energy development under
ARRA 2009 or the recent downturn and recovery in the US economy. This study is
especially interested in the year effects of 2009 and 2010 when the Federal government
awarded cash grants to renewable electricity developers under ARRA. Significant year
effects in 2009 and 2010, in particular, could give us some evidence of the effectiveness
of Federal effort to develop renewable industries through the stimulus package.
Table 3 presents the operational definitions and data sources of all dependent and
independent variables used in the final models.

54

EIA, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/index.cfm
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Table 3. Variable definitions and data sources
Variable
Total renewable
electricity

Definition
Total amount of electricity in MWh generated from non-hydro
renewable (other renewables)

Share of
renewable
electricity
Command-andcontrol policy
index

Percentage of renewable electricity out of total net electricity generation

Market-based
approach index
Information
instrument index
Wind potential

Number of existing renewable energy policy instruments classified as
market approach in a state each year, range 0-11
Number of existing renewable energy policy instruments classified as
information instrument in a state each year, range 0-2
Annual average daily measure of wind speed at 10 m above the surface
of the earth in m/s for average latitude and longitude of each state
Annual gross state product per capita, inflation adjusted to 2010 dollar
value

Per capita GSP

Share of fossil
fuel
manufacturing
Share of mining
industry
Sierra
membership
Democrat
Governor
House score
State and local
NR employment
Total electricity
sales
Natural gas price
Electricity price
Share of nuclear
Share of hydro
Share of IOU
Electricity export
ratio

Number of existing renewable energy policy instruments classified as
command-and-control type instrument in a state each year, range 0-5

Percentage of the product in the petroleum and coal manufacturing
industry out of total GSP

Data Source
U.S. Energy
Information
Administration (EIA)
EIA

Database of State
Incentives for
Renewables &
Efficiency (DSIRE)
and by author
DSIRE and by author
DSIRE and by author
NASA
U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis
(BEA)
BEA

Percentage of the product in the mining industry out of total GSP

BEA

Number of the Sierra Club chapter membership per 1,000 state
population
If governor’s political affiliation is democrat, 1; republican or
independent, 0.
Average voting scores on environmental issues of House of
representatives, range 0-100
Number of full-time equivalent employees working for natural resources
in state and local governments per million people within a state

Sierra Club HQ

Total amount of residential, commercial, and industrial electricity sales
within each state, MWh
Annual average natural gas price purchased by electric power industry
in cents per million Btu, inflation adjusted to 2010 dollar value
States’ average annual retail electricity price
Percentage of nuclear power generation out of total electricity
generation
Percentage of hydro conventional electricity generation over total
amount of electricity generation
Percentage of electricity sales of investor-owned-utilities over total
electricity sales
The amount of electricity generation divided by total sales in Mwh
within states.

National Governors
Association
League of
Conservation Voters
Census

EIA
EIA
EIA
EIA
EIA
EIA
EIA

Note: Data are retrieved for 48 states and the time period of years between 2001 and 2010.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

This section presents the results of statistical analyses which test the hypotheses
discussed in the previous section. This study is mainly to examine and compare the
effectiveness of three different types of policy instrument on states’ renewable energy
development, all other things being equal. This study measures renewable energy
development within each state and observes state level renewable energy policy
instruments and all other independent variables across 48 states, excluding Alaska,
Hawaii, and D.C., over the time period between 2001 and 2010. This section first covers
the trends in renewable energy development and variation in states’ policy design for
developing renewable energy in the United States, focusing on 48 states over the past
decade. A descriptive analysis of all other independent variables is following. Then, this
section presents results from statistical models which tests the hypotheses of this study.
The conclusion highlights how the effectiveness of renewable energy policies varies
depending on the types of policy instruments and what other variables explain the states
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renewable energy development. It also compares the estimations from different model
specifications.
5.1 Trends in Renewable Electricity Generation
In order to examine the relationships between renewable energy policies and their
effects, it is important to observe variation in states’ policy designs and renewable
electricity generation among states over years. Overall trends in the electricity industry of
the 48 states, in terms of electricity generation by sources, are shown in Table 4. In 2010,
48 states generated a total of 4,107 TWh electricity, which grew by 10.4% compared to
the total electricity generation in 2001. Of a 388 TWh growth in electricity generation, 84%
increased between 2001 and 2006. The economic recession that the United States
experienced in 2008 and 2009 can account for a weakening in the growth in the overall
electricity market.
Meanwhile however, for electricity generation, the 48 states increased their use of
non-hydro renewable technologies by 139% between 2001 and 2010. From 2006 to 2010,
the energy industry generated 70 TWh of electricity from non-hydro renewable sources,
accounting for 73% of total change since 2001. The electricity industry had a rapid
increase in the share of non-hydro renewable sources in electricity generation. In 2001,
non-hydro renewable technologies were used for 1.9% of total electricity generation, but
in 2010 electricity suppliers generated 4% of electricity from non-hydro renewable
sources (see Table 5).
Table 4 shows the averages of 48 states’ total electricity, non-hydro renewable
electricity generation, and percentages of non-hydro renewable electricity, and the results
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of analysis of variance (ANOVA) that compare changes of those three measures over
years. Since 2001, 48 states’ average total electricity increased from 77.5 TWh to 85.6
TWh, but there was no statistically significant increase (F=.17, p=.84) between years
considering the variance among states. During the same period, however, electricity
generation using non-hydro renewable technologies increased statistically significantly
(F=3.09, p=.048) at 95% confidence level. Average non-hydro renewable electricity of
the 48 states increased from 1,463 GWh in 2001 to 3,466 GWh in 2010. Therefore, the
percentage of non-hydro renewable electricity also significantly changed over years
(F=5.88, p<.00).
Table 4. Electricity Generation by Year (MWh, %)

Total
Electricity
Non-hydro
Renewable
Electricity
Percent
Non-hydro
Renewable

Year
2001
2006
2010
2001
2006
2010
2001
2006
2010

N
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

Mean
77,482,157
84,299,737
85,568,009
1,463,368
1,997,604
3,465,679
2.19
2.81
4.85

S.D.
67,779,197
73,991,627
74,894,552
3,164,466
3,548,012
5,248,432
3.36
3.65
4.78

Minimum
5,480,614
5,967,725
5,627,645
0
417
138,197
0.00
0.01
0.29

Maximum
372,580,002
400,582,878
411,695,046
21,600,000
23,900,000
27,700,000
19.55
23.59
24.40

F
.17

p

3.09

.048

5.88

.00

.84

There appear differences in the size of electricity supply and energy sources
between states. Table 5 shows total electricity generation, non-hydro renewable
electricity, and percentage of non-hydro renewable electricity by states over the years of
2001-2010. In 2010, Texas was ranked first in total electricity generation with 411.7
TWh, accounting for 10% of total electricity generated in the 48states. Pennsylvania,
Florida, California, and Illinois have large electrical generating industries that produced
more than 200 TWh of electriciy in 2010. Of these states, Texas and California were
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ranked first and second in use of non-hydro renewable technologies for electricity
generation. Each state generated more than 25 TWh electricity from renewable sources,
and their total accounted for 32% of U.S. total renewable electricity generation in 2010.
When looking at the percentage of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable
sources, Maine was ranked first with 24.4%; and Iowa (16.3%), South Dakota (13.7%),
California (12.5%), Minnesota (12.4), and North Dakota (11.8) are following in 2010
(see Table 5).
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Table 5. Electricity Generation by State (MWh, %)
Area
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total

2001
125,345,113
89,911,272
47,192,035
198,596,075
46,876,002
30,490,646
6,807,684
190,945,344
118,316,789
9,346,941
179,249,285
122,569,673
40,658,512
44,748,523
95,417,626
87,894,377
19,564,821
49,062,340
38,478,434
111,845,610
48,523,226
53,446,452
79,544,873
24,232,485
30,485,212
33,875,966
15,074,624
59,421,260
33,611,643
143,914,559
117,495,850
30,332,072
142,261,807
55,249,450
45,051,906
196,576,591
7,501,892
89,158,987
7,400,743
96,221,976
372,580,002
35,853,750
5,480,614
74,104,750
83,048,669
81,836,725
58,763,431
44,776,938
3,719,143,555

Total Electricity
2006
140,895,441
104,392,528
52,168,703
216,798,688
50,698,353
34,681,736
7,182,179
223,751,621
138,010,208
13,386,085
192,426,958
130,489,788
45,483,462
45,523,736
98,792,014
90,921,829
16,816,173
48,956,880
45,597,775
112,556,739
53,237,789
46,228,847
91,686,343
28,243,536
31,669,969
31,860,022
22,063,695
60,700,139
37,265,625
142,265,432
125,214,784
30,881,137
155,434,075
70,614,880
53,340,695
218,811,595
5,967,725
99,267,606
7,132,243
93,911,102
400,582,878
41,263,324
7,084,344
73,069,537
108,203,155
93,815,804
61,639,843
45,400,370
4,046,387,390

2010
152,150,512
111,750,957
61,000,185
204,125,596
50,720,792
33,349,623
5,627,645
229,095,935
137,576,941
12,024,564
201,351,872
125,180,739
57,508,721
47,923,762
98,217,658
102,884,940
17,018,660
43,607,264
42,804,824
111,551,371
53,670,227
54,487,260
92,312,989
29,791,181
36,630,006
35,146,248
22,195,912
65,682,494
36,251,542
136,961,654
128,678,483
34,739,542
143,598,337
72,250,733
55,126,999
229,752,306
7,738,719
104,153,133
10,049,636
82,348,625
411,695,046
42,249,355
6,619,990
72,966,456
103,472,729
80,788,947
64,314,067
48,119,254
4,107,264,431

Non-Hydro Renewables
2001
2006
2010
4,189,364
3,884,462
2,376,986
39,437
53,567
318,907
1,511,997
1,722,805
1,623,943
21,600,000
23,900,000
25,400,000
112,843
896,228
3,554,533
908,924
763,320
739,660
0
417
138,197
3,789,757
4,330,690
4,486,723
3,002,754
3,418,918
3,180,563
533,335
689,957
1,014,010
678,569
848,832
5,138,159
114,580
220,212
3,245,666
591,612
2,454,717
9,360,483
39,832
991,890
3,459,351
9,553
458,798
439,875
2,704,289
2,962,363
2,467,776
3,825,725
3,967,651
4,152,283
373,015
626,161
573,665
1,312,787
1,278,829
1,273,734
2,361,663
2,442,559
2,832,452
1,977,113
3,058,884
6,639,633
1,432,117
1,541,082
1,504,270
8,798
23,971
987,597
65,425
530,385
1,027,157
19,293
313,261
493,153
1,199,873
1,343,711
2,286,647
1,025,621
746,380
1,232,218
843,632
916,783
850,054
18,652
1,277,321
1,854,792
1,801,072
2,596,641
4,814,548
1,751,290
1,828,305
2,083,142
7,665
373,029
4,108,028
430,961
458,615
700,089
230,696
2,009,724
4,159,956
839,528
1,828,988
4,756,880
1,896,196
2,472,946
4,245,175
103,616
148,913
140,073
894,154
1,910,437
1,873,064
871
148,965
1,371,750
822,025
810,599
987,550
2,180,945
7,818,260
27,700,000
158,238
205,476
780,967
382,541
449,910
482,339
1,747,072
2,458,450
2,219,649
1,221,331
2,502,854
6,616,963
15,527
174,053
939,172
1,102,210
1,265,623
2,473,956
365,159
759,061
3,246,793
70,241,657
95,885,003
166,352,581
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Percent Renewables
2001
2006
2010
3.34
2.76
1.56
.04
.05
.29
3.20
3.30
2.66
10.89
11.03
12.47
.24
1.77
7.01
2.98
2.20
2.22
.00
.01
2.46
1.99
1.94
1.96
2.54
2.48
2.31
5.71
5.15
8.43
.38
.44
2.55
.09
.17
2.59
1.46
5.40
16.28
.09
2.18
7.22
.01
.46
.45
3.08
3.26
2.40
19.55
23.59
24.40
.76
1.28
1.32
3.41
2.81
2.98
2.11
2.17
2.54
4.08
5.75
12.37
2.68
3.33
2.76
.01
.03
1.07
.27
1.88
3.45
.06
.99
1.35
3.54
4.22
6.51
6.80
3.38
5.55
1.42
1.51
1.29
.06
3.43
5.12
1.25
1.83
3.52
1.49
1.46
1.62
.03
1.21
11.83
.30
.30
.49
.42
2.85
5.76
1.86
3.43
8.63
.97
1.13
1.85
1.38
2.50
1.81
1.00
1.93
1.80
.01
2.09
13.65
.85
.86
1.20
.59
1.95
6.73
.44
.50
1.85
6.98
6.35
7.29
2.36
3.37
3.04
1.47
2.31
6.40
.02
.19
1.16
1.88
2.05
3.85
.82
1.67
6.75
1.89% 2.37% 4.05%

5.2 Innovative Policy Designs for Renewable Energy Development
Between 2001 and 2010, the 48 states developed new renewable energy policy
designs. Overall, states have implemented an increasing number of programs and policies
and also diversified their approaches to electricity markets so as to increase the use of
renewable energy technologies. Table 6 shows the average number of renewable energy
policies utilized by 48 states, reflecting the years 2001, 2006 and 2010. As mentioned
before, 18 state level policies and programs supporting renewable energy development
were equally weighted and classified into three types of policy instruments. The
command-and-control instrument index ranges from zero to five; the market-based
instrument ranges from zero to eleven; and the information instrument ranges zero to two.
The sum of the three policy instruments is presented as “Total” in the table.
Overall, state governments have significantly increased their intervention in
renewable energy industries. Mean values of Table 6 show the average number of total
renewable energy policy instruments that each 48 states adopted in each year. It is
evident that state governments have introduced more policy instruments to the renewable
energy market (F=17.58, p<.00) (Table 6). The number of policy instruments adopted by
48 state governments was almost doubled between 2001 and 2010. The 48 state
governments had adopted only one command-and-control type policy instrument, on
average, for motivating renewable energy producers in 2001, but in 2010 states utilized
on average two kinds of command-and-control instruments. A huge increase is seen in
market-based instruments used by state governments. State governments offered, on
average, six types of market-based incentives for the power producers to deploy more
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renewable energy technologies in 2010. Information instruments were also introduced
and increased to use at state level.
Table 6. Number of Policies for Renewable Energy Development by Year
Policy
Instruments
Commandand-control
(0-5)
Market-Based
(0-11)
Information
(0-2)
Total
(0-18)

Year
2001
2006
2010
2001
2006
2010
2001
2006
2010
2001
2006
2010

N

Mean
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

1.1
1.6
2.04
3.17
4.29
5.98
0.33
0.63
0.65
4.6
6.52
8.67

Std.
Deviation
1.057
1.267
1.271
1.993
2.343
2.226
0.476
0.64
0.729
2.819
3.632
3.563

Std. Error
0.153
0.183
0.183
0.288
0.338
0.321
0.069
0.092
0.105
0.407
0.524
0.514

F

p

7.305

0.001

20.017

0.000

3.764

0.026

17.58

0.000

There are variations between states and years in regards to the existence of
renewable energy policy instruments. In 2001, 48 states adopted 4.6 renewable energy
policies or programs out of 18 programs on average. New York adopted the greatest
number of renewable energy policies in 2001: three regulations, seven market incentives,
but no information instruments. California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon had nine
policy instruments and Arizona, Massachusetts, Montana, and Rhode Island had adopted
eight programs to encourage renewable energy development. On the other hand, however,
until 2001, 18 states had not adopted any kind of regulatory instrument and only 10 states
introduced an informative/voluntary policy instrument to their energy industry. Three
states, Louisiana, South Carolina, and West Virginia, did not have legislative activities to
force or incentivize their electricity industry to deploy renewables, in respect to the 18
policies or programs in which this is interested. Interestingly, 13 states such as Indiana,
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North Carolina, and Tennessee supported the use of renewable energy technologies
through market instruments, but did not introduce any regulatory nor informative policy
instruments (see Table 7).
As of 2010, there were, on average, 8.6 legislated policies or programs for
renewable energy development per state in the 48 states. Massachusetts and Oregon had
implemented 16 renewable energy programs and incentives. Massachusetts had
introduced all 11 types of market instruments, including market regulations and financial
incentives. New York and New Jersey had 15 and 13 renewable energy policies/programs
respectively. Also eleven states55 had more than 11 policies supporting renewable energy
development. As of 2010, every state had adopted at least one policy instrument
supporting renewable energy technologies. Six states—Idaho, North Dakota, Tennessee,
Oklahoma, Alabama, and Mississippi—had not yet adopted regulatory or informative
policy instruments, but had introduced market instruments. Half the 48 states had
introduced at least one information instrument into their electricity industry to encourage
energy suppliers to voluntarily employ renewable energy technologies (Table 7).

55

Connecticut, Maine, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin (12), California, Montana,
Rhode Island (11) in 2010.
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Table 7. Number of Renewable Energy Policy Instrument by State, Year
2001
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

Command
-andcontrol
0
2
2
3
0
3
2
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
3
1
2
1
2
0
0
2
0
2

Marketbased
2
5
3
5
3
5
1
3
1
4
2
4
6
3
1
0
2
6
5
0
7
1
2
5
2
4

2006
Informa
tion

All RE
Policies

0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1

2
8
5
9
4
9
3
5
2
4
4
4
7
3
1
0
6
7
8
2
9
1
2
8
2
7

Command
-andcontrol
0
2
1
4
2
4
3
1
1
0
2
1
2
0
1
1
2
2
3
2
3
0
0
3
0
3

2010

Marketbased

Informa
tion

3
3
1
7
2
5
3
2
2
5
2
3
8
3
2
3
4
8
10
4
7
1
4
6
2
5

0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
2
0
1
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All RE
Policies
3
6
2
12
5
10
7
4
3
5
5
4
12
3
3
4
7
11
14
7
12
1
4
11
2
9

Comman
d-andcontrol
0
3
1
4
2
4
3
2
1
0
3
1
2
2
1
1
4
2
4
4
3
0
2
3
1
3

Marketbased
3
6
1
6
6
7
4
6
6
5
6
6
8
5
7
5
6
9
11
5
8
1
4
7
4
6

Informa
tion
0
0
0
1
2
1
2
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1

All RE
Policies
3
9
2
11
10
12
9
9
7
5
10
7
12
7
8
6
12
12
16
10
12
1
6
11
5
10

Total
change
20012010
1
1
-3
2
6
3
6
4
5
1
6
3
5
4
7
6
6
5
8
8
3
0
4
3
3
3

Table 7. Number of Renewable Energy Policy Instrument by State, Year
(Continued)
2001
State
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Average
Total

Command
-andcontrol

Marketbased

2006
Informa
tion

All RE
Policies

Command
-andcontrol

2010

Marketbased

Informa
tion

All RE
Policies

Comman
d-andcontrol

Marketbased

Informa
tion

All RE
Policies

Total
change
20012010

1

3

1

5

1

3

0

4

2

5

0

7

2

3
2
3
0
0
2
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
3
1
1.10
53.00

3
2
7
4
4
5
1
7
2
6
0
1
2
5
1
2
4
5
0
4
2
3.17
152.00

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
.33
16.00

7
4
10
4
4
7
1
9
4
8
0
1
2
7
2
3
5
6
0
7
3
4.60
221.00

4
1
4
0
0
2
0
2
4
2
1
0
0
2
2
2
1
1
1
3
1
1.60
77.00

7
6
10
5
6
8
3
8
3
5
1
1
3
4
5
3
4
5
2
6
3
4.29
206.00

1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
.63
30.00

12
8
15
5
6
11
3
11
8
8
2
1
3
7
7
6
6
8
3
9
4
6.52
313.00

3
2
4
2
0
3
0
4
3
2
1
1
0
2
2
2
1
2
1
4
1
2.04
98.00

9
7
10
8
5
8
4
10
6
8
5
2
5
5
6
10
6
5
4
8
3
5.98
287.00

1
1
1
0
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
.65
31.00

13
10
15
10
5
12
4
16
10
11
6
3
5
8
8
12
9
9
5
12
4
8.67
416.00

6
6
5
6
1
5
3
7
6
3
6
2
3
1
6
9
4
3
5
5
1
4.06
195.00
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Diversity and Coerciveness of Policy Instruments
To answer the questions whether state governments have diversified their policy
instruments for supporting the deployment of renewable energy, a detailed investigation
on is made on the states’ use of renewable energy policies. The renewable energy policies
and programs that were most frequently adopted and implemented by state governments
in 2001 were economic regulations, and as such these were classified as market
instruments in this study. 31 states applied net-metering systems to their electricity
markets and introduced access laws to recognize and protect accessibility to solar or wind
as a property right. In 2010, about a quarter of the states gave various tax benefits for the
investment and installation of renewable energy technologies: corporate tax (10 states),
personal tax (11 states), property tax (16 states), and sales tax (12 states) credits.
However, some programs or incentives such as green power purchasing programs,
production incentives, or required green power options were rarely used by states’
renewable energy policy designs back in 2001.
Overall states introduced a larger number of programs and policies in their
renewable energy policy portfolios between 2001 and 2010. Policy instruments also
became more diversified in the sense that new policy instruments—green power
purchasing, production incentives, green power option—were introduced and adopted
during the period. Forty one states implemented net-metering programs as of 2010.
Interconnection standards have been adopted and applied in 41 state and 25 states
adopted them since 2001. Thirty five states have adopted solar or wind access laws with
voluntary easements. Twenty eight states of the 48 states have implemented renewable
portfolio standards.
93

In the beginning of governmental intervention into renewable electricity markets,
back in the early 2000s, the most popular approaches were net-metering and access laws.
These are economic regulations that reduce market barriers and provide assurance of
property rights for solar and wind access. State governments began setting up electric
power markets favorable to renewable energy developers by using policy instruments
characterized by medium level coerciveness, rather than highly coercive command-andcontrol instruments. During and after the period of electricity restructuring, however,
very coercive command-and-control instruments—RPS, interconnection and PBFs—have
been adopted in many states; also information disclosure of power industries has been
mandated in many states during the time period. Financial incentives including various
tax expenditures, and governmental subsidies and grants have increasingly been adopted
as states’ policy instruments supporting renewable energy development. For recent years,
new policy instruments such as performance-based or production incentives and green
power options have been introduced and adopted at the state level.
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Table 8. Number of States with Renewable Energy Policies
Policy
Instruments
Command
-andControl

Illustrative Tools

Obligations
License/process
standard
Market systems
Subsidies and
Grants

Market-Based

Tax Expenditures

Renewable Energy
Policies and Programs
Green Power Purchasing

Information

2006

2010

2

7

3

RPS

11

20

28

PBF

14

15

17

Contractor License

10

7

9

Interconnection

16

28

41

Net-Metering

31

35

41

Access Laws

31

30

35

Rebates

9

17

22

Grants

10

17

23

Loans

13

21

35

Production Incentives

1

6

9

Corporate Tax Credit

10

15

22

Personal Tax Credit

11

15

21

Property Tax Credit

16

26

32

Sales Tax Credit

12

17

27

Industry Support

8

7

20

16

25

22

0

5

9

Disclosure
Information

2001

Required Green Power Option
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5.3 Regression Results
5.3.1 Estimation Issues
In order to find out an appropriate statistical analysis model for the time-series
cross sectional data, this study performed and compared three different models: pooled
OLS regression analysis, random-effects, and fixed-effects estimates analyses. Analyses
were performed on 480 observations: 48 states for the time period from year 2001
through 2010. The fixed-effects and pooled OLS regression models are based on the
assumption of a linear relationship between variables, while random-effects models are
based on feasible generalized least squares. This study transformed the dependent and
independent variables to build a base model which meets the assumptions of ordinary
least square regression best. This section describes the process through which the final
panel model was decided.
First of all, the research examined the skewness of the distribution of dependent
and independent variables, and transformed whichever ones needed to be transformed to
achieve a normal or symmetric distribution. The outcome variables of this study, MWh of
electricity generated from renewable sources and the share of renewable electricity, both
had right-skewed distributions. Among various methods used for handling asymmetric
distributions of measures, this study used a natural log transformation. This is a popular
means to normalize univariate data (See Appendix C). The natural log transformation
resulted in a distribution more nearly symmetric and closer to a normal distribution for
both variables. Also, the measures of most of independent variables were skewed to the
right. For normally distributed measures of independent variables, a natural log
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transformation was used. Those variables are electricity price, natural gas price, shares of
nuclear and hydro power, electricity export ratio, per capita GSP, shares of fossil fuel
manufacturing and mining industry, number of Sierra Club membership per 1,000 capita,
state and local governmental employees, and wind energy potential. Renewable energy
policy instrument indices and the average congressional House voting scores on
environmental issues were nearly normally distributed.
Next, this study compared three different panel regressions—pooled OLS,
random-effects, and fixed-effects regressions—to verify the appropriateness of the
analytical modeling done in this study. In a previous section, the researcher discussed the
assumptions and purposes of three panel regression models for the study. The logical
conclusion was that a fixed-effects model is conceptually most appropriate for the
purpose of the analysis as well as the virtue of the panel data used in this study. The
fixed-effects model is also attractive when a study intends to investigate the causes of
changes within an entity. With adjustment for heteroskedasticity, a fixed-effects estimate
usually provides a valid inference (Wooldridge, 2011).
The following paragraphs introduce the step-by-step process of statistical model
selection this study. Park (2011)’s guidelines suggest to begin with pooled OLS
regression model, and to examine whether or not there is observed or unobserved
heterogeneity, that is, cross-sectional or time-series effects. This study thus started with a
pooled OLS without fixed and/or random effects as a base model. Then, this base model
was compared to a least square dummy variable (LSDV) model with year dummy
variables for year specific effects as well as to a LSDV with state dummy variables, in
order to examine the existence of state fixed effects.
97

As expected on the basis of the literature review and research design sections, the
results found evidence of time effect. Unobserved year fixed effects existed in two
respective models. The first was on in which the dependent variable was log transformed
MWh of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources. The second was on in
which the dependent variable was log transformed share of renewable electricity. For
both models, LSDV with year dummy variables fitted the data better than the pooled
OLS. The R square increased; F statistic increased; while sum of squares due to residual
(SSE) decreased.
The results of the LSDV models with state dummy variables showed strong
evidence of the unobserved heterogeneity of individual (or state) effects. State dummy
variables significantly improved the goodness-of-fit of models: R-squared increased; the
model F statistic increased; and sum of squared errors (SSE) decreased in both models
with two different outcome measures.
Given the substantial evidence of unobserved heterogeneity due to state-specific
and/or year-specific effects, the researcher then employed a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier (LM) test. The LM test is usually conducted to decide between a pooled OLS
and random-effects regression. The null hypothesis of the LM test was that state-specific
or year-specific error variance components were zero (homoscedasticity). That is, the null
hypothesis was that there was no significant difference across states over years (Breusch
and Pagan, 1980). Test results rejected the null hypothesis. Therefore it was determined
that a random effects model is appropriate as compared to an OLS regression for both
models with different dependent variables (See Appendix D.1 and D.2).
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Next, a Hausman test was conducted to decide between fixed-effects and randomeffects estimates for the base regression model with year dummy variables. The basic
idea of Hausman test is to test whether there is heterogeneity or unique errors correlated
with the regressors (Hausman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2012). The null hypothesis of the
Hausman test was that the random-effects and fixed-effects estimates are not different. In
general, a fixed effect model is favorable when the null hypothesis is rejected (Hausman,
1978; Wooldridge, 2012). Even though many prior scholars (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge,
2012) proved that the fixed-effects estimate is more convincing model for the purpose of
policy analysis, a formal test for a statistically significant difference between randomand fixed-effects models is also common (Wooldridge, 2012). In this research, Hausman
tests on the two different dependent variables both rejected the null hypothesis (See
Appendix D.1 and D.2). This means that there exist state-fixed unique errors in the panel
data of this study. The researcher, therefore, decided to employ fixed-effects regression
models for the analysis.
Given the decision to use fixed-effect estimate models, this study conducted
several post-estimate diagnostics tests for cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity,
and serial correlation of residual. Because the fixed-effects regression applies the OLS
estimators, the classical assumptions of OLS regression on residuals/error be considered:
independent and identical (or homoscedastic) distribution of errors.
The presence of special correlation of residuals can bias the analysis results.
Cross-sectional dependence is more problematic in macro panels with long time-series
(over 20-30 years) than in micro panels according to Baltagi (2001). Although this study
has 10 years of time-series, a residual diagnostic test for contemporaneous correlation
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was conducted. To test whether the residuals resulted from a fixed-effect regression are
correlated across states, Pasaran cross-sectional dependence (CD) test was used. The null
hypothesis of the test is uncorrelated residuals. Test results for both regressions—with
amount of electricity generated from renewable resources and with share of renewable
electricity—did not find statistically significant cross-sectional dependence of residuals
(See Appendix D.1 and D.2).
A test for the OLS assumption of homoskedastic distribution of residuals was also
conducted. Non-constant variance of errors does not lead to biased parameter estimates,
but p-values are unreliable. A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in
fixed-effect regression was conducted (Greene, 2000; Baum, 2001). The null hypothesis
of the test is constant variance of residuals for all cross-sectional units. The test results
rejected the null hypothesis, so the presence of heteroskedastic residuals was detected for
both models.
Serially correlated residuals of cross-sectional time series regression based on
OLS estimates can bias the standard errors and make the results less efficient (Drukker,
2003). Baltagi (2008) argues that the residuals of linear panel data regression are likely to
be serially correlated because a dynamic effect of shocks is usually distributed over years.
This study used the test suggested by Wooldridge (2003) for diagnostic of autocorrelation
of residuals. Woodridge’s test uses the residuals from a first-difference regression, which
removed the effects of time-invariant covariates and constant (Drukker, 2003). The null
hypothesis is no serial correlation of residuals. Wooldridge’s tests showed that there are
statistically significant first-order autocorrelation in the residuals of fixed-effects models
of the panel data.
100

Although tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of residuals in panel
regressions have become routinely (Born and Breitung, 2010; Yin and Powers, 2010;
Chrimali and Kniefel, 2011), some previous studies on the effects of renewable energy
policies did not take seriously account of the violation of these assumptions (Carley,
2009). Diagnostic test results showed that the panel data of this study has heteroskedastic
and serially correlated residuals with fixed-effects regressions with year-fixed dummy
variables (See Appendix D.1 and D.2). In order to adjust for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation of residuals, this study employed the “cluster-robust” or consistent (HAC)
standard errors suggested by Wooldridge (2003) and Druckker (2003).
5.3.2 Regression results
The fixed-effects estimates with cluster-robust standard errors including yearfixed dummy variables proved to be the best suitable analytical model for the
longitudinal data of this study in terms of the statistical diagnostics test results as well as
the policy analysis purpose of the study.
Table 9 presents the result from the fixed-effects estimates with a dependent
variable equal to the total amount of electricity generation from non-hydro renewable
sources. Cluster-robust standard errors, errors clustered by states, are used to account for
the heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation found in the model (Drukker, 2003;
Wooldridge, 2003). The primary independent variables of interest are three policy
instrument indices for renewable energy developments.
The result demonstrates that the number of command-and-control type of policy
instruments adopted by a state government has a positive and significant association with
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the amount of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources (t=2.73, p=.009),
all else being equal. In other words, the increase of states’ electricity generated from nonhydro renewable sources over the past decade can be significantly attributed at least in
part to the use of more diversified command-and-control type of policies that state
governments have adopted to enforce electric power suppliers to use more renewable
energy technologies.
On the other hand, the market approach index (t=-1.27, p=.211) and information
instrument index (t= 1.19, p=.238) do not have statistically significant associations with
the amount of renewable electricity generation in states. States’ introduction of additional
policy instruments based on economic incentives to date has not shown to be effective in
affecting the increase of electricity generation using non-hydro renewable sources in
states, all else being equal. Also, the increase of renewable electricity generation in recent
years is not statistically significantly explained by the adoption of information disclosure
or green power options program, with which state governments mandate electric power
suppliers to provide customers such information on the sources of electricity generation
of companies and to offer customers to choose electricity generated using renewables.
The fixed-effects estimates result in Table 9 shows significant predictors of the
amount of renewable electricity generation. This study hypothesized that states’
characteristics of natural endowment, economy, political environment, and electric
market conditions together with governmental intervention determine the electricity
producers’ behavior on renewable electricity generation. The result shows that states’
natural endowment measured by wind energy potential has a statistically significant and
positive association (t=3.08, p=.003) with net electricity generation using non-hydro
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renewable sources. It demonstrates that wind speed in a state influences the generation of
renewable electricity, all else being equal.
Among the state economic factors expected to affect the power industry’s
electricity generation using renewable sources, state wealth is a significant predictor of
renewable electricity generation in states. This study measures state wealth as per capita
gross state product (GSP) and the analytic results show a statistically significant and
positive association (t=2.39, p=.021) between a state’s per capita GSP and the amount of
renewable electricity generated in the state. This can be understood that wealthier states
deploy more renewable energy technologies to produce electricity. Other economic
factors representing industrial structure of mining industry and fossil fuel interest groups
however are not statistically significant in the model.
The result demonstrates that citizen’s interest and preference toward
environmental issues are related to states’ renewable electricity generation. Table 5.7
shows that the number of Sierra Club membership per thousand state population has a
highly significant and positive association (t=2.79, p=.008) with the amount of renewable
electricity generation within a state.
Other two variables indicating states’ political environment, democrat
governorship and the degree of state legislators’ preference for environmental issues,
were also assumed to affect states’ decision on renewable energy policy adoption and
implementation. The political affiliation of governors to the democrat party shows a
positive sign (t=1.41, p=.165), but is not statistically significant with cluster-robust
standard errors. State legislators’ preference favorable to environmental issues also does
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not show a significant influence on the increase of electricity generation using non-hydro
renewable energy technologies. This can be understood that once renewable energy
policies have decided policy decision makers such as governors or legislators are unable
to affect the use of renewable energy technologies in the electric power industry.
The electricity demand and the cost of electricity resource in states are significant
predictors of states’ net generation of renewable electricity. Table 9 shows that the
coefficient of electricity demand in a state, measured by total MWh of electricity sales
within the state, is highly significant and positive (t=2.4, p=0.02). This means that the
amount of renewable electricity is accordingly determined by the size of electricity
markets in a state. The wholesale price of natural gas purchased by electric power
industries in a state shows a significant and positive association at marginal level (t=1.92,
p=0.061) with the net generation of renewable electricity within the state. This means that
electric power producers are more likely to invest in or to deploy renewable energy
technologies when natural gas prices, a portion of the cost of production, rises for seeking
alternative cost competitive energy sources. However, the average retail price of
electricity, the proportions of nuclear and conventional hydro power generation, the share
of investor-owned utilities in total MWh of electricity sales, and the export/import ratio
of electricity in states are not statistically significant predictors of the amount of
renewable electricity production.
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Table 9. Regression results for logged total MWh of renewable electricity generation
from non-hydro renewable sources
Variables
Fixed Effects
Command-and-control
0.156 (0.057)***
Market-Based Approach
-0.033 (0.026)
Information Instruments
0.139 (0.116)
Wind potential (ln)
0.559 (0.182)***
Per capita GSP (ln)
1.955 (0.819)**
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
0.042 (0.07)
% Mining (ln)
0.05 (0.049)
Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln)
1.116 (0.4)**
Democrat Governor
0.128 (0.09)
LCV House Score
0.001 (0.002)
State&Local NR Emp (per million) (ln)
-0.123 (0.226)
Total Electricity Sales (ln)
3.322 (1.382)**
Natural Gas Price (ln )
0.589 (0.307)*
Electricity Price (ln)
-0.048 (0.188)
% Nuclear Power (ln)
0.289 (0.546)
% Hydro Power (ln)
0.043 (0.088)
% IOU (ln)
0.393 (0.357)
Electricity Export Ratio (ln)
0.201 (0.171)
a
Year 2002
0.002 (0.091)
Year 2003
-0.113 (0.088)
Year 2004
-0.1 (0.182)
Year 2005
-0.224 (0.209)
Year 2006
-0.067 (0.214)
Year 2007
-0.097 (0.243)
Year 2008
0.037 (0.197)
Year 2009
0.678 (0.219)***
Year 2010
0.677 (0.247)***
Constant
-73.530 (23.220)
R-squred
.61
Adjusted R-squared
.59
Observations
480
Number of state fixed effects
48
F-test (model)
7.05***
Model degrees of freedom (with 48 clusters)
26
Note: Cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis; *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
a
Omitted category: Year 2001
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Table 10 displays the results of fixed-effects estimates for the logged share of
non-hydro renewable electricity generation. The dependent variable in this model is the
percentage of non-hydro renewable electricity that measures the relative use of non-hydro
renewable energy technologies and resources of the electric power industry in states. The
variation in the share of non-hydro renewables electricity generated in states’ electric
power industry indicates how policy instruments and other factors influence electricity
suppliers alter their decision and behavior on renewable electricity generation. Table 10
presents the coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors of variables, including year
dummies. This study corrected the standard errors which are heteroskedastic and auto
correlated, by applying cluster-robust standards errors clustered on states (Wooldridge
2003).
This study hypothesized that the more command-and-control type of policy
instrument state governments adopt the more renewable electricity is generated in the
electric power market. The command-and-control policy instrument index is positive and
significant at 95 percent confidence level (t=2.01, p=.05), all else being equal. This
model also demonstrates that additional adoption of command-and-control type of policy
instruments increase the proportion of renewable sources used for electricity production
in states. In other words, when state governments adopt and implement more diversified
command-and-control instruments, one observes a significant replacement of electric
power sources from other conventional sources to non-hydro renewable sources.56
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According to an EIA’s report, Electric Power Monthly (2013), between 2001 and 2011, the share of
electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources increased from 1.9% to 5.4%, while the proportion
of coal power declined from 51% to 37.4%, natural gas increased from 17% to 30.5%; and petroleum liquid
usage in electricity generation dropped from 3% to 0.3% in the United States. Retrieved from
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_1, on March 27, 2013.
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Information instruments index has a statistically significant and positive
association (t=1.79, p=.08) with the share of renewable electricity at 90 percent
confidence level. Although the effect is for all practical purposes a marginal one, states’
intervention into the electric power market using informative and voluntary policy
instruments such as information disclosure or green power options seemed to affect
power suppliers to alter their source of energy production from others to non-hydro
renewables, all else being equal.
Among the three categories of policy instruments, market-based policy
instruments appear to be the least effective in the renewable energy market. The result
demonstrates that additional adoption of market-based instruments by a state is not a
statistically significant determinant of an increase of the share of renewable electricity in
the state (t=-1.21, p=.231).
In addition to the effects of the three categories of policy instruments that state
governments implement, this model explained the increase of renewable share of
electricity generation with wind potential, state economic and political environments, and
electricity market conditions in states. Wind energy potential is also significant and
positive (t=3.34, p=.002). All else being equal, the variation of the share of renewable
sources in electricity generation is partially but significantly attributable to annual
average wind speed in states.
States’ economic wealth explains the proportion of non-hydro renewables in
electricity generation of the states. All else being equal, per capita gross product in states
has a statistically significant and positive association (t=2.44, p=.018) with the share of
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renewable electricity in states. This can be understood to mean that when a state
economically grows, the state is likely to seek alternative energy sources that possibly
replace the conventional source of energy, which is today fossil fuels.
The size of the total electricity demand in a state does not statistically
significantly explain the relative use of renewable sources in electricity generation in the
state (t=1.19, p=.241). As seen in the first model (Table 9), the amount of renewable
electricity generation increases as the electricity demand/consumption in a state grows.
However, increasing demand for electricity does not affect electric power producers’
choice between conventional and renewable sources.
Instead, interestingly enough, the ratio of net electricity generation (MWh) to total
electricity sales (MWh) in a state is strongly related to the proportion of the use of
renewable sources in power production in the state. The ratio of electricity generation to
sales in a state measures whether the state exports or imports electricity. The assumption
is that if a state’s net generation of electricity exceeds the total electricity sales in MWh
within the state, the state will export its excess to other states and vice versa. The analysis
result shows that states’ electricity export ratio or generation to sales ratio has a
statistically significant and negative association (t=-2.67, p=.01) with the share of
renewable electricity generation. In other word, a state that imports electricity from
outside uses more renewable energy technologies in electricity production within the
state.
The wholesale price of natural gas in states is positive and statically significant
(t=2.1, p=.041), all else being equal. This analytic result demonstrates that the price of
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conventional power sources, natural gas in particular, affects the decision of power
producers on the source of electricity generation. When natural gas prices increase, states
increase either/or their investment in or operation of renewable energy technologies,
probably due to the relative competitiveness of renewables.
Citizen’s interest in environmental issues is also evidently a significant
determinant of the relative use of non-hydro renewables for power generation under
given policy designs and electric market conditions. Table 10 shows a positive and
statistically significant association between the relative size of a state’s Sierra Club
membership and the share of renewable resource in electricity generation in that state
(t=2.34, p=.024), all else being equal. This means that the more people become interested
in and get involved in environmental issues, the larger proportion of electricity is
produced using renewable energy technologies in states.
Other variables measured for states’ political and legislative preference toward
environmental issues are not statistically significant in the analysis with the share of
renewable electricity (Table 10). Coefficients of both political affiliation of governor
(t=1.53, p=.133) and average house voting score for environmental issues (t=.94, p=.354)
have positive signs with the proportion of renewables in net electricity generation, but
neither of them are statistically significant.
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Table 10. Regression results for logged share of renewable electricity generation
Variables
Fixed Effects
Command-and-control
0.102 (0.051)**
Market-Based Approach
-0.031 (0.025)
Information Instruments
0.204 (0.114)*
Wind potential (ln)
0.577 (0.173)***
Per capita GSP (ln)
2.035 (0.834)**
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
0.054 (0.064)
% Mining (ln)
0.040 (0.046)
Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln)
0.950 (0.407)**
Democrat Governor
0.121 (0.079)
LCV House Score
0.003 (0.003)
State&Local NR Emp (per million) (ln)
-0.014 (0.252)
Total Electricity Sales (ln)
1.545 (1.300)
Natural Gas Price (ln )
0.605 (0.288)**
Electricity Price (ln)
-0.079 (0.212)
% Nuclear Power (ln)
0.086 (0.522)
% Hydro Power (ln)
-0.007 (0.068)
% IOU (ln)
0.207 (0.334)
Electricity Export Ratio (ln)
-0.452 (0.169)***
Year 2002
-0.014 (0.080)
Year 2003
-0.125 (0.079)
Year 2004
-0.166 (0.153)
Year 2005
-0.279 (0.178)
Year 2006
-0.139 (0.182)
Year 2007
-0.154 (0.210)
Year 2008
0.009 (0.193)
Year 2009
0.617 (0.207)***
Year 2010
0.619 (0.236)**
Constant
-54.738 (22.119)
R-squared
.58
Adjusted R-squared
.56
Observations
480
Number of state fixed effects
48
F-test (model)
5.00***
Model degrees of freedom (with 48 clusters)
26
Note: Cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis; *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
a
Omitted category: Year 2001

110

5.4 Findings
The fixed-effects models of this study, using two separate operational definitions
of renewable energy development showed very consistent results. The analytic results
supported the primary research hypotheses of this study on the effectiveness of three
types of policy instruments. Also, this study found meaningful results regarding other
control variables. Those variables significantly associated with the increase of renewable
electricity production supported the hypothetical relationship that this study derived from
the literature review.
Hypothesis 1 was about the implementation of command-and-control types of
renewable energy policy instruments and the deployment of renewable energy
technologies in electricity production. This study hypothesized that a state with more
command-and-control type of policy instruments will deploy more renewable energy.
The results of both fixed-effects models demonstrated the significant and positive
associations of command-and-control policy instrument index with the net generation of
renewable electricity as well as with the share of non-hydro renewables in electricity
production in states.
The second research hypothesis was that the diversification of market-based
policy instruments is not associated with an increase in renewable energy generation in
states. The fixed-effects models failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
significant relationship between the number of market-based instruments and both the
amount of electricity generation from renewables and the proportion of renewable
electricity, all else being equal.
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Hypothesis 3 was about the effectiveness of the additional adoption of
informative policy instruments. The fixed-effects model with the amount of electricity
generation from non-hydro renewable sources failed to reject null hypothesis. Therefore,
the increase of the amount of renewable electricity generation was evidently not
attributable to the number of information instruments adopted by states. However, the
analysis with dependent variable measured by relative use (%) of non-hydro renewables
in electric power production supported the hypothesis. The more a state diversified
information instruments, the larger share of electricity generated from renewable sources.
More detailed interpretation and policy implications will be discussed in the following
section regarding inconsistent analytical results on hypothesis 3.
Regarding other variables, not all variables show significant associations with the
increase of renewable electricity generation, but all five components of factors—natural
resource, economic, political, and market circumstances and state policies—were found
to affect deployment of non-hydro renewables. More details are discussed in the
discussion section.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

6.1 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of three
different types of policy instruments implemented by state governments to support
renewable energy development. This was accomplished by first analyzing currently
adopted states’ legislative renewable energy programs and incentives, then by classifying
them into three categories of policy approaches: command-and-control, market-based,
and information instruments.
There was a significant increase in the overall number of policy instruments that
state governments introduced for renewable energy development between 2001 and 2010.
Popular policy instruments have changed with time. In the very beginning of
governmental intervention, the role of governments was to set foundational rules for
renewable energy suppliers. Afterward, command-and-control instruments, represented
by renewable portfolio standards, have been adopted in many states. State governments
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began using authoritative and coercive policy tools to alter the behavior of electricity
producers to use more renewable sources. With Federal support for the renewable energy
industry, state governments have also provided a variety of financial incentives to
renewable energy developers. To date, states have continued to develop new policy
instruments including information instruments and financial incentives.
This study then analyzed the effectiveness of the policy instruments which have
been diversified over time. The researcher expected that additional adoption of
command-and-control or information instruments would positively affect electricity
production from renewable sources, holding other factors constant. Diversification of
market-based instruments, however, was suspected to have significant impact on the
increase of renewable power generation. For the most part, the analysis results supported
the primary research hypotheses.
The increase in the amount and share of renewable electricity both were attributed
by adoption of more command-and-control instruments. This implies that the
diversification of authoritative and coercive approaches of state governments’
intervention in electric power industries has effectively altered the power suppliers’
choice of energy sources from conventional to non-hydro renewables. Even though
regulatory approaches have been criticized with respect to cost-effectiveness and
flexibility, authoritative and coercive governance tools have been effective in achieving
policy goals at the early stage of governmental intervention. Moreover they have been
effective specifically in the area where market systems do not generate socially
appropriate goods and services (Harrington et al., 2004).

114

Regarding market-based instruments, results did not find significant evidence of
effectiveness. The results verified the theoretical arguments that market-based policy
instruments or economic incentives do not guarantee the achievement of policy goals
(Hammar, 2006; Harrington, et al., 2004). The results are also consistent with prior
empirical studies that examined the influence of financial incentives on renewable energy
capacity or production (Delmas and Montes, 2011).
Over the past decade and a half, states have developed and adopted a variety of
market-based policy instruments for the purpose of increasing electricity production
using renewable sources. However, the analytic results show some evidence that the use
of diverse market-based instruments does not always result in policy effectiveness. A
possible explanation is that these market-based instruments, adopted by states, failed to
incentivize or motivate people to use renewable energy technologies in electricity
production. While market players in the electric power industry benefited from using
given market-based instruments, the renewable energy outcome did not meet state
governments’ expectations (Hammar, 2006). In either case, the states’ market-based
policy designs do not seem appropriate or effective as a catalyst for renewable energy
production.
Especially, financial incentives including tax expenditures and subsidies or loans
may mislead the energy market. Electricity producers may enjoy the financial benefits
from purchasing and installing renewable energy equipment offered by the governments
to reduce their cost of electricity generation from renewable sources. However, at the
same time, electricity producers may want to invest more, as much as they save from
governmental support for renewables, in purchasing their conventional sources of
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electricity such as coal or natural gas. If this is the case, financial incentives can hardly be
expected to show the expected short-term outcomes in terms of proportion of renewables
of total electricity generation.
This study showed results consistent with prior empirical studies (Yin and Power,
2009, Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011) that estimated the
effects of individual informative programs. They found a positive and significant impact
of green power options on renewable energy capacity. This study showed that the number
of information instruments did not explain the amount of electricity generation from
renewable sources, but helped to explain the share of renewables in electricity production.
A possible explanation is that information given to consumers does not necessarily
translate to new investment in renewable energy systems. Instead, the availability of
information influences electric power producers to choose to alter the power sources from
conventional to renewable sources. This story is moreover supported by positive and
significant influence of citizen interest in environmental issues on the amount and share
of renewable electricity in states.
The political environment has been expected to affect policy adoption and
innovation (Yi and Feiock, 2012). However, once policy designs have developed,
achievement of policy goals depends on policy implementation rather than on state
legislators or governors’ preference or citizen preference and involvement (represented
by Sierra Club membership). Put it another way, although different governments may
intervene in the power market with similar type of policy instruments, market incentives
in particular, people may or may not be motivated to alter their behavior depending on
their pre-existing interest and preference toward the environment and green energy.
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Citizens with favorable preferences toward environmental issues could either be
consumers or producers of electricity, or both. As consumers, they could exercise their
pressure on electric power utilities to use clean energy sources. Or, they also can generate
renewable electricity as independent power producers, or produce combined heat and
power produced using renewable energy equipment.
As seen in the results, state wealth measured by per capita GSP was the single
most important factor accounting for variation in the increase in electricity production
using renewable sources. Such results suggest that wealthy states have more interest and
capacity to invest in environmentally friendly projects (Ringquist, 1994; Sapat, 2004),
which is consistent results what previous empirical studies found (Carley, 2009; Shrimali
and Kniefel, 2011; Delmas and Monte-Sancho, 2010). Even though this study examined
the impact of state wealth on renewable electricity production, it is possible that the state
wealth induces investment in clean energy industry either from inside or outside state
developers.
Pre-existing conditions of the electricity market also significantly affect the actual
use of renewable source for electricity production in a given year. As the U.S.
experienced in the early 1990s and 2000s, natural gas price inversely correlates with
investment in renewable energy technologies. A huge decline in natural gas prices in the
early 90s hindered the growth rate of renewable energy as industry stagnated; the Energy
Crisis in California in early 2000s motivated Western states to invest more in alternative
power sources.
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Interestingly, the average retail price of electricity does not seem significant in
both models, while natural gas price consistently seem to serve as a significant factor.
This implies that electricity suppliers care about the cost-effectiveness or efficiency and
consider non-hydro renewables as their alternative resources to reduce the cost of
production. On the other hand, the sales price or retail price at which consumers purchase
electricity does not seem to influence power suppliers’ choice of power sources in any
ways.
States’ experience of importing electricity is also an important determinant of the
relative use of renewable sources for electricity generation. The more a state imports
electricity from other states, the larger the share of renewable electricity. This study
assumed that those states with export of a greater proportion of electricity are less likely
to replace their conventional sources of electricity production with non-hydro renewables.
Conversely, those states where import more electricity from other states for their in-state
consumption are likely to use relatively more renewable sources to produce electricity. It
is also possible that a state may increase its import of electricity from other states by
intention of exporting carbon emissions generated from coal-fired power production,
while promoting renewable energy technologies within the state.
The results showed that the coefficients of year dummies 2009 and 2010 in both
models are consistently significant and positive compared to year 2001. It was originally
expected that the economic recession between 2008 and 2010 would slow the increase in
energy sector, also tempering with the growing renewable industry. However, at least
partially due to the heavy investment offered by the Federal Stimulus Package--cash
grant in lieu of tax credit to renewable energy project developers under ARRA of 2009-118

renewable electricity has increasingly generated during the period of economic recession.
In fact, between 2008 and 2010 average annual growth rate of the total amount of
renewable electricity, from non-hydro renewable sources, was 16.7%, more than twice
the average annual growth rate of the previous three years (8.2%) in the U.S.57 The
results of this study with significant year dummies 2009 and 2010 give us evidence of the
effectiveness of Federal stimulus package under ARRA of 2009. In other words, Federal
government’s active supports for renewable energy projects, in addition to state specific
economic and political characteristics and state government led policy designs,
influenced the overall growth of the renewable electricity industry since 2009.
6.2 Policy Implications
There was significant variation in renewable energy policy designs among states
over time. However, some commonalities among these policy instruments also emerged.
Without a well-designed policy evaluation, it is hard to say if states have developed and
used the policy instruments due to the effectiveness or policy diffusion effects across
neighboring states.
To date, command-and-control types of policy instruments such as renewable
portfolio standards have been regarded as the dominant and effective tools in the electric
power markets for an increase of renewable electricity production. However, it is too
early to assume that the authoritative and coercive policy approach is the best instrument.
It is only in the recent years that the government has intervened in the electricity market
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Calculation of the average annual growth is done by the author. Electricity data is from the Energy
Information Administration.
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using the command-and-control instruments, which have the possibility to achieve policy
goals at a faster rate than other instruments (Harrington et al. 2004).
Similarly the insignificant effects of market-based instruments revealed by the
analysis results do not mean that state governments need to stop financial supports for
renewable energy developers. The market-approach may take a longer time to affect the
electric power industry. We may need to wait until the investment in renewable energy
technologies and equipment are effectively operating. Another issue is the possibility that
Federal support for renewable energy industries, under the ARRA of 2010, diminished
the impact of states-setting incentive systems for the renewable energy market. In that
case, continuing experiments and evaluation of market-based policy instruments are
necessary for improvement of policy designs.
Over the long history of the federal government’s support for electric power
sectors using fossil fuel and nuclear power, renewable electricity has been at a
competitive disadvantage. As long as fossil fuel or nuclear-based electricity is being
incentivized, renewable energy policies, especially financial incentives will experience
difficulties in taking immediate effects.
In addition, increased availability of oil and gas achieved by recently permitted
shale drilling in the U.S. may put a brake on the recent trend of increasing deployment of
renewable energy technologies. As oil and gas extraction businesses boom, the market
equilibrium of supply and demand would move the natural gas price downward, which
affects electric power producers’ choice of power sources, consistent with the analysis
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results. Therefore, policy makers must have a comprehensive consideration when they
make policy designs for renewable energy development.
Analytical results showed that both informative/voluntary instruments and social
interest in environment are important. Together with citizen “Go Green programs,”
sermons to the electric industry become important. Under given circumstances, financial
and institutional capacity, one of the possible and effective ways that state and local
governments can approach deployment of renewable electricity is to educate and
enlighten both suppliers and consumers of electricity. Innovative policy instruments such
as information, education, voluntary agreements, etc. are highly recommended to be
designed.
6.3 Strength, limitation, and future direction
This study has several strengths. First of all, this study makes a contribution to
policy instrument studies through the practice of classifying policies empirically into
groups and examining the effectiveness of additional adoption of policy instruments:
command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments. Previous studies
(Vedung, 1998; Schneider and Ingram, 1990) conceptually discussed the appropriate
categorization of policy instruments, while others classified existing policies related to
renewable energy development into their chosen groups of policy instruments
(Enzensberger, et al., 2002; Menz, 2005; Beck and Martinot, 2004; Jonstone, et al., 2008).
However, they rarely applied their classification of policy instruments to an empirical
analysis of policy evaluation, which relates policy instruments to policy effects.
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Through the empirical classification of policy instruments, this study found
several lessons which would help us better understand of policy instruments classification.
With applying the tri-fold categories of policy instruments—command-and-control,
market-based, and information—, rather than the degree of coerciveness, the behavioral
assumption under each policy tool serves as a more helpful and useful criterion for the
classification. Many previous studies (Vedung, 1998; Salamon, 2002) conceptually
categorized policy instruments or tools based on the level of coerciveness. This study,
however, mainly applied the behavioral assumption of policy tools that Schneider and
Ingram (1990) discussed, with more or less consideration of the degree of government
authority or coerciveness inherent in policies.
Because the subject public policies and programs dealt in the research are all state
legislative policies and many of them mandate energy suppliers a certain types of
obligations, using the coerciveness criterion was not sufficient to distinguish renewable
energy policies into three groups of policy instruments. Hence, this study adopted three
behavioral assumptions through which governments intend to alter policy targets’
behavior toward accomplishing policy goals: coercion, use of material resources, and
intellectual/moral appeals. For instance, generation/environmental disclosure programs
are requirement set by state legislation for electric utilities to provide customers
information. This program may appear like a command-and-control type policy
instrument from the respect of coerciveness because it requires activities of policy targets.
However, the information disclosure itself does not directly coerce electricity suppliers to
accomplish a certain goal, rather it can appeal to electricity suppliers’ conscience as well
as consumer’s intellectual decision making, indirectly influencing electricity generators’
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choice of energy sources. Therefore, based on the policy instrument’s behavioral
assumption, this study assigned the disclosure program in the group of information
instrument.
Another lesson is that the market-based instrument defined by this study included
somewhat too broad range of policies and programs, 11 of 18 renewable energy policies,
to be considered homogeneous within a group. Net-metering programs and renewable
energy access laws, in particular, were classified as market-based policy instruments
under the tri-fold classificatory scheme. However, these two instruments are somewhat
different in nature from other policies under the group of market-based instrument. Other
nine market-based policies are all financial incentives directly offered to renewable
energy suppliers such as tax expenditures, loans, and subsidies, whereas net-metering and
access laws are adopted to arrange electric market systems preferable to initiating and
developing renewable electricity generation and distribution. In the future studies,
especially in the area that has pre-existing market, researchers may want to divide
market-based policy instruments into more than two groups: one is about financial
incentives given by governments which change the production cost or market prices of
goods and services in principle; and the other is about market systems which shift
demand and/or supply.
Second possible contribution of this research is building a database of
comprehensive and historical information on states’ renewable energy policies. Such
database would enable the measurement of variance of policy instruments utilized by
states over time. Furthermore, a time-variant measure of policy instrument indices would
allow policy analysts and policy makers to determine whether the implementation of
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diverse policy instruments, classified by regulatory, incentive-based and informative
policy instruments, is effective in terms of renewable electricity production within a state.
In addition, this study also has done some to advance a study on the determinants
and mechanism of the development of renewable energy industries. Results found that
the amount and share of renewable electricity production in a state is merely affected by
economic variables such as economy of scale or price of substitutes, but also affected by
political environments including related policies.
Although this study contributes to policy instrument studies in terms of exercising
a tri-fold scheme of policy instruments, it is not without limitation. One limitation
concerns the intervention of subjectivity in classification of renewable energy policy
instruments. Renewable energy policies were classified based on theoretical and logical
classificatory criteria discussed in previous literature. However, due to limited time and
resources, the classification was conducted by the author, and the inter-subjective
reliability of the classification has not been tested. I expect that a survey of experts can
practically adjust and enhance the classificatory schemes in the future.
Another limitation deals with the measure of policy instrument indices. This study
has not considered the degree of relative coerciveness/strictness of policy tools or the
importance of individual renewable energy policies. Instead, the researcher weighed each
renewable energy policy or program equally and measured the existence of individual
renewable energy policies in a state with dummy variables.
As an extension of my dissertation, I propose to examine the effects of policy
instruments mixes and to find the appropriate form of policy mix for the multi-level,
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state-and-local, governance of renewable energy development. Since the 1990s, interest
in “policy mixes,” has increased (OECD, 2001; Persson, 2006). Combined policy
instruments were considered to complement and reinforce each other to enhance the
overall effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation compared to a single
instrument (Rist, 1998). In addition, governments implemented multiple types of policy
tools to solve complex policy issues (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Lafferty and
Meadowcroft, 1996). Therefore, selecting the most appropriate combination of
instruments comprises a crucial component of a policy design that would maximize the
goal achievement and minimize political economic costs (Peters, 2002).
A very simple methodological approach to look at the effect of policy instrument
mix will be analyzing the interaction effect coefficients between three policy instruments.
In addition, I also propose to categorize types of policy instrument mix depending on the
diversity and magnitude of governments’ policy adoptions. Possible policy mix scenarios
that I expect include: a state with a full set of command-and-control instruments that uses
least number of market-based instruments; a state with least use of all instruments; a state
with a full set of market-based instruments and half of others, etc. Then, I would classify
observations (states) based on their form of policy instrument mix into 3 or 4 groups and
those groups will be considered as explanatory variable.
I also propose to find the determinants of multi-level policy instrument adoption
for renewable energy development. Applying the types of policy instruments, it is
expected to discover the mechanism under which local and state governments prefer
certain types of policy tools or mixes. There are considerable studies on determinants of
policy innovation and adoption. Before 1990, state government innovation study was
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dominated by testing internal determinants, national interaction, or diffusion models
(Balla, 2001; Berry and Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Mintrom, 1997; Walker, 1969, etc.).
Recently, however, alternative forms of diffusion such as vertical influence between
federal, state, and local governments were suggested (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel,
2004). Some claim that the motivation for policy diffusion includes both policy learning
and competition (Boehmke and Witmer, 2004). Some previous studies employed both
internal determinants and diffusion effects to analyze determinants of renewable energy
policy or climate protection policy adoption of local governments (Krause, 2010;
Matisoff, 2008; Yi and Feiock, 2012).
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APPENDIX A - E
Appendix A. Descriptive Analysis of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable
Non-hydro Renewable Electricity
Percentage Non-hydro Renewable
Ln Non-hydro Renewable Electricity
Ln Percentage Non-hydro
Renewables
Command-and-control
Market-Based Approach
Information Instruments
Total Electricity Sales (ln)
Natural Gas Price (ln )
Electricity Price (ln)
% Nuclear Power (ln)
% Hydro Power (ln)
% IOU (ln)
Electricity Export Ratio (ln)
Per capita GSP (ln)
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
% Mining (ln)
Sierra Membership (per 1,000, ln)
Democrat Governor
LCV House Score
State&Local NR Emp (per million,
ln)
Wind potential (ln)

Obs
480
480
480
480

Mean
2,151,752
3.01
13.94
0.78

Std. Dev.
3,909,227
3.83
1.17
0.93

Min
0.001
0.0001
11.57
-1.06

Max
27,700,000
26.08
17.14
3.27

480
480
480
480
480

1.61
4.48
0.59
17.72
7.25

1.31
2.34
0.65
0.97
0.14

0
0
0
15.49
6.79

5
11
2
19.7
7.55

480
480
480
480
480
480
480
480
480
480
480
480

18.18
3.1
0.89
5.08
-0.21
10.22
-1.25
-0.86
0.56
0.49
48.74
6.43

0.67
0.69
1.77
0.21
0.52
0.27
1.52
1.93
0.56
0.5
26.62
0.62

16.83
2.27
-2.41
4.81
-2.08
9.48
-5.08
-4.36
-0.83
0
0
4.75

19.87
4.5
4.5
5.41
1.15
10.93
2.93
3.55
1.82
1
100
8.02

480

0.86

0.28

0.11

1.51
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Appendix B. Correlation Analysis of Variables (Pearson r, n=480)

1. Non-hydro Renewable Electricity (ln)
2. Percentage Non-hydro Renewable (ln)
3. All Renewable Energy Policies
4. Command-and-control
5. Market-Based Approach
6. Information Instruments
7. Wind potential (ln)
8. Per capita GSP (ln)
9. % Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
10. % Mining (ln)
11. Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln)
12. LCV House Score
13. State&Local NR Emp (per 1,000) (ln)
14. Total Electricity Sales (ln)
15. Natural Gas Price (ln )
16. Electricity Price (ln)
17. % Nuclear Power (ln)
18. % Hydro Power (ln)
19. % IOU (ln)
20. Electricity Export Ratio (ln)

1. Non-hydro Renewable Electricity (ln)
2. Percentage Non-hydro Renewable (ln)
3. All Renewable Energy Policies
4. Command-and-control
5. Market-Based Approach
6. Information Instruments
7. Wind potential (ln)
8. Per capita GSP (ln)
9. % Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
10. % Mining (ln)
11. Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln)
12. LCV House Score
13. State&Local NR Emp (per 1,000) (ln)
14. Total Electricity Sales (ln)
15. Natural Gas Price (ln )
16. Electricity Price (ln)
17. % Nuclear Power (ln)
18. % Hydro Power (ln)
19. % IOU (ln)
20. Electricity Export Ratio (ln)

1
1.00
0.74
0.25
0.27
0.16
0.28
-0.16
0.12
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.11
-0.16
0.54
0.00
0.27
0.27
0.11
0.02
-0.06

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.00
0.26
0.24
0.19
0.26
-0.02
0.11
0.08
-0.13
0.26
0.32
0.02
-0.10
-0.02
0.35
0.10
0.31
0.05
-0.17

1.00
0.80
0.92
0.63
0.12
0.45
0.21
-0.32
0.56
0.49
-0.41
0.14
0.06
0.52
0.06
0.11
0.05
-0.21

1.00
0.52
0.51
0.11
0.46
0.13
-0.34
0.50
0.51
-0.46
0.14
0.09
0.60
0.16
-0.03
0.05
-0.16

1.00
0.41
0.10
0.32
0.21
-0.24
0.43
0.38
-0.32
0.09
0.03
0.36
-0.01
0.17
0.05
-0.19

1.00
0.10
0.37
0.13
-0.21
0.57
0.31
-0.21
0.13
0.02
0.33
0.01
0.08
-0.02
-0.16

1.00
0.31
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.07
-0.26
-0.02
0.03
-0.24
-0.20
-0.04
0.05

1.00
0.21
-0.36
0.43
0.33
-0.42
0.07
0.07
0.39
0.13
-0.12
-0.12
-0.31

1.00
-0.10
0.18
0.09
-0.11
-0.08
0.04
-0.07
0.10
0.16
-0.05
0.10

1.00
-0.37
-0.59
0.47
0.05
-0.18
-0.53
-0.37
0.03
0.01
0.46

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1.00
0.48
-0.24
-0.14
0.01
0.37
0.04
0.28
0.03
-0.15

1.00
-0.39
-0.13
0.12
0.62
0.19
0.02
0.11
-0.19

1.00
-0.39
-0.10
-0.59
-0.43
0.26
-0.09
0.30

1.00
0.09
0.07
0.37
-0.20
-0.03
-0.19

1.00
0.14
0.11
-0.06
-0.42
-0.12

1.00
0.40
-0.12
0.09
-0.25

1.00
-0.13
0.01
-0.15

1.00
-0.06
0.02

1.00
-0.02

1.00
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Appendix C. Transformation of variables
Dependent Variables:

0

0

.1

1.0e-07

Density
2.0e-07

Density
.2

.3

3.0e-07

4.0e-07

.4

MWh of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources vs. Ln RE generation

0

1.00e+07

2.00e+07

3.00e+07

12

13

nhydro_re

14
15
ln_nhydro_re

16

17

0

0

.05

.2

.1

Density

Density
.15

.4

.2

.6

.25

Share of non-hydro renewable electricity vs. Ln RE share

0

5

10
15
nhydro_re_percent

20

25

-1
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0

1
ln_nhydro_percent

2

3

Appendix D.1 Estimation Issues and Process with Dependent Variable: Ln MWh of
Renewable Electricity Generation
Pooled OLS vs. random-effects models
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
ln_nhydro_re[fips,t] = Xb + u[fips] + e[fips,t]
Estimated results:
Var
ln_nhyd~e
e
u
Test:

sd = sqrt(Var)

1.36683
.1267048
.6225506

1.169115
.3559562
.7890187

Var(u) = 0
chi2(1) =
Prob > chi2 =

997.39
0.0000

Fixed- vs. Random-fixed effects: Hausman test
Test:

Ho:

difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(2
27) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
85 .4 1
Prob>chi2 =
0 .0 00 0
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

Cross-sectional correlation test (after fixed-effects regression): xtcsd, pesaran abs
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =

-0.817, Pr = 0.4137

Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =

0.427

Heteroskedasticity test: xttest3
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
in fixed effect regression model
H 0: s ig ma (i )^ 2 = si gm a^ 2 fo r al l i
chi2 (48) =
Prob>chi2 =

1 56 4. 07
0. 00 00

Serial correlation test: xtserial
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F( 1,
47) =
9 5. 08 2
Prob > F =
0. 00 00

Cluster-robust standard error: cluster(fips)
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Appendix D.2 Estimation Issues and Process with Dependent Variable: Ln Share of
Renewable Electricity Generation
Pooled OLS vs. random-effects models: xttest0
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
ln_nhydro_percent[fips,t] = Xb + u[fips] + e[fips,t]
Estimated results:
Var
ln_nhyd~t
e
u
Test:

. 866 22 96
. 115 46 57
. 467 43 81

sd = sqrt(Var)
. 93 07 146
. 33 98 025
. 68 36 945

Var(u) = 0
chi2(1) =
Prob > chi2 =

879 .8 0
0 .0 00 0

Fixed- vs. Random-fixed effects: Hausman test
Test:

Ho:

difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(2
27) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
85 .79
Prob>chi2 =
0.0 000
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

Cross-sectional correlation test (after fixed-effects regression): xtcsd, pesaran abs
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =

-0.481, Pr = 0.6305

Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =

0.441

Heteroskedasticity test: xttest3
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
in fixed effect regression model
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
chi2 (48) =
Prob>chi2 =

2040.87
0.0000

Serial correlation test: xtserial
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F( 1,
47) =
115.88 7
Prob > F =
0.00 00

Cluster-robust standard error: cluster(fips)
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Appendix E.1Regression Results of Total Amount of Renewable Electricity Generation:
OLS, RE, FE, and FE with cluster-robust S.E.
OLS
MWh Renewable Electricity
Generation (Ln)
Command-and-control
Market-Based Approach
Information Instruments
Wind potential (ln)
Per capita GSP (ln)
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
% Mining (ln)
Sierra Membership/1,000 (ln)
Democrat Governor
LCV House Score
State&Local NR Emp/million (ln)
Total Electricity Sales (ln)
Natural Gas Price (ln )
Electricity Price (ln)
% Nuclear Power (ln)
% Hydro Power (ln)
% IOU (ln)
Electricity Export Ratio (ln)
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006
Year 2007
Year 2008
Year 2009
Year 2010
Constant
R square
Adjusted R square
Number of observations
F or Wald chi2
p-value
Df

RE

FE

Coef.

S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

-0.027
-0.060
0.235
0.046
0.118
0.068
0.047
-0.023
0.044
0.004
0.579
1.071
-1.589
0.820
0.096
0.149
1.081
0.066
-0.039
0.312
0.899
1.118
1.018
1.051
0.982
0.716
0.925
-6.368
0.5585
0.5322
480
21.28
0.000
27

0.044
0.021***
0.078***
0.159
0.190
0.028**
0.031
0.119
0.079
0.002
0.095***
0.070***
0.534***
0.113***
0.071
0.026***
0.394***
0.088
0.175
0.169*
0.241***
0.273***
0.244***
0.246***
0.210***
0.189***
0.189***
5.242

0.106
-0.053
0.107
0.509
1.301
0.011
0.101
0.502
0.117
0.001
0.122
1.032
0.474
-0.126
0.184
0.105
0.511
0.134
0.077
0.056
0.224
0.166
0.337
0.367
0.403
0.880
1.011
-26.321
0.3414

0.035***
0.016***
0.061*
0.108***
0.272***
0.043
0.038***
0.184***
0.050**
0.002
0.136
0.177***
0.312
0.113
0.180
0.055*
0.256**
0.137
0.085
0.085
0.141
0.160
0.147**
0.154**
0.131***
0.119***
0.128***
5.260***

0.156
-0.033
0.139
0.559
1.955
0.042
0.050
1.116
0.128
0.001
-0.123
3.322
0.589
-0.048
0.289
0.043
0.393
0.201
0.002
-0.113
-0.100
-0.224
-0.067
-0.097
0.037
0.678
0.677
-73.530
0.6103
0.5390
480
23.49
0.000
74

0.035***
0.016**
0.061**
0.106***
0.325***
0.048
0.043
0.252***
0.049***
0.002
0.160
0.818***
0.302*
0.123
0.415
0.082
0.254
0.165
0.084
0.087
0.147
0.170
0.162
0.179
0.150
0.134***
0.156***
14.807

480
575.34
0.000
27
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FE w. Cluster-robust
S.E.
ClusterCoef.
robust
S.E.
0.156 0.057***
-0.033 0.026
0.139 0.116
0.559 0.182***
1.955 0.819**
0.042 0.070
0.050 0.049
1.116 0.400***
0.128 0.090
0.001 0.002
-0.123 0.226
3.322 1.382**
0.589 0.307*
-0.048 0.188
0.289 0.546
0.043 0.088
0.393 0.357
0.201 0.171
0.002 0.091
-0.113 0.088
-0.100 0.182
-0.224 0.209
-0.067 0.214
-0.097 0.243
0.037 0.197
0.678 0.219***
0.677 0.247***
-73.530 23.220
0.6103
0.5390
480
7.05
0.000
26

Appendix E.2 Regression Results of Share of Renewable Electricity Generation: OLS,
RE, FE, and FE with cluster-robust S.E.
Share of Renewable Electricity
Generation (Ln)

OLS

RE

FE

Coef.

S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

Coef.

S.E.

Command-and-control
Market-Based Approach
Information Instruments
Wind potential (ln)
Per capita GSP (ln)
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln)
% Mining (ln)
Sierra Membership/1,000 (ln)
Democrat Governor
LCV House Score
State&Local NR Emp/million (ln)
Total Electricity Sales (ln)
Natural Gas Price (ln )
Electricity Price (ln)
% Nuclear Power (ln)
% Hydro Power (ln)
% IOU (ln)
Electricity Export Ratio (ln)
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005
Year 2006
Year 2007
Year 2008
Year 2009
Year 2010
Constant

-0.059
-0.047
0.183
0.111
-0.246
0.059
0.049
0.136
0.000
0.004
0.480
0.046
-1.413
0.773
0.125
0.146
0.933
-0.376
-0.033
0.296
0.827
1.052
0.974
1.046
0.966
0.729
0.922
2.515

0.040
0.019**
0.070***
0.142
0.170
0.025**
0.028*
0.107
0.071
0.002**
0.085***
0.063
0.477***
0.101***
0.064*
0.023***
0.352***
0.079***
0.156
0.151*
0.215***
0.244***
0.218***
0.220***
0.188***
0.169***
0.169***
4.687

0.051
-0.049
0.167
0.515
1.142
0.023
0.091
0.408
0.115
0.003
0.196
-0.016
0.445
-0.097
0.217
0.101
0.304
-0.413
0.049
0.040
0.142
0.099
0.249
0.290
0.356
0.792
0.912
-18.386

0.033
0.015***
0.058***
0.104***
0.255***
0.040
0.036**
0.171**
0.048**
0.002
0.128
0.157
0.299
0.107
0.160
0.051**
0.245
0.128***
0.082
0.082
0.134
0.153
0.140*
0.147**
0.124***
0.113***
0.121***
4.887

0.102
-0.031
0.204
0.577
2.035
0.054
0.040
0.950
0.121
0.003
-0.014
1.545
0.605
-0.079
0.086
-0.007
0.207
-0.452
-0.014
-0.125
-0.166
-0.279
-0.139
-0.154
0.009
0.617
0.619
-54.738

0.034***
0.015**
0.058***
0.101***
0.311***
0.046
0.041
0.240***
0.046***
0.002
0.153
0.781**
0.288**
0.118
0.396
0.079
0.242
0.157***
0.080
0.083
0.141
0.163*
0.155
0.171
0.144
0.128***
0.149***
14.135

R square
Adjusted R square
Number of observations
F or Wald chi2
p-value
Df

0.4431
0.4098
480
13.32
0.000
27

0.1153
480
479.43
0.000
27
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0.5810
0.5045
480
20.80
0.000
74

FE w. Cluster-robust
S.E.
ClusterCoef.
robust
S.E.
0.102 0.051**
-0.031 0.025
0.204 0.114*
0.577 0.173***
2.035 0.834**
0.054 0.064
0.040 0.046
0.950 0.407**
0.121 0.079
0.003 0.003
-0.014 0.252
1.545 1.300
0.605 0.288**
-0.079 0.212
0.086 0.522
-0.007 0.068
0.207 0.334
-0.452 0.169***
-0.014 0.080
-0.125 0.079
-0.166 0.153
-0.279 0.178
-0.139 0.182
-0.154 0.210
0.009 0.193
0.617 0.207***
0.619 0.236***
-54.738 22.119
0.5810
0.5045
480
5.00
0.000
26

